

Deprecatives

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This is a conference about honorifics and their opposites; but what are they, these "opposites"? I have chosen a made-up word, *deprecatives*, as my title to help us think about what falls at the other end of the scale from "honorification." (Part of my aim, implicit in what follows, is to reflect on whether there *is* a single scale here; and if so, a scale of *what*?) Of course, the word *deprecate* exists. Its etymological source is "to avert by prayer."² Lexicographers give the modern reading "to disapprove of, often with mildness," or, in a sense perhaps produced by rubbing shoulders with *depreciate*, "to represent as of little value or claim to esteem." This has the desired ring of honorifics about it, appropriately in reverse. The etymological link with prayer, additionally, incorporates an element of *performativity*--action through words--which will be a theme of my remarks.

Nonetheless, I wanted a term unfamiliar enough to cover a lot of ground, because I want to commend to you a range of linguistic phenomena that cover everything from "mild devaluation" to outright condemnation and abuse. Just as in the case of honorifics, the dimensions of "value" and "esteem" involved in deprecatives are varied. They remind us how *multiply* language indexes and constitutes social life. As an anthropologist, interested in social action, and merely poaching on the ground of linguistic specialists, I draw my examples from several sources. However, I will concentrate largely on the Tzotzil speech of my friends and neighbors from Zinacantán, in highland Chiapas, Mexico, and especially on marital disputes, where we may expect a heavy dose of deprecatives.

Honor and dishonor; respect and disrespect; politeness and impoliteness; compliment and insult

There are several conceptual issues that I need to mention first, without much hope of disentangling them all..

Language and action

When we venture into the realm of deprecatives, we are immediately caught in the (now) familiar web of language as action. Once you see that you can be polite simply by talking, then the possibilities for verbal action immediately appear to be limitless. Here I have in mind not only the strict variety of Austinian performative (of which "be polite" is, of course, *not* an example, although, perhaps "commend" or "honor" can be), but rather

¹ This is a draft of a paper presented at the NSF sponsored Reed/PSU Honorifics conference, April 8-10, 1988. These hastily written notes are for comment and criticism only. Please do not cite or quote; please *do* comment.

² Hence, 'deprecate' has an archaic meaning "supplicate or beseech," particularly in the usage, "to pray against, to seek to avert" (in the 1966 Webster's Unabridged).

what Wittgenstein claimed were "countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'" (PI, sect. 23)--countless kinds of things that we do characteristically through speech (of which being polite probably *is* an example). And just as you can characteristically "be polite" through words, you can also give someone the cold shoulder using only your mouth.

The folk theories of natives other than Oxford or Cambridge philosophers also accord an active, creative power to speech. My Guugu Yimidhurr acquaintances, from northeastern Queensland, Australia, warn me that curses can kill; that names of dead people can summon their ghosts; and that pronouncing the wrong words to your father-in-law can get (or could once have gotten) you speared. Tzotzil speakers, too, claim that speech, for example scolding natural elements--the verb is *-ut*, which also means 'say [something] to'--can bring about specific, often undesirable, results.

For example, Laughlin, in his encyclopedic dictionary of modern Zinacanteco Tzotzil (to which I will have considerable recourse in what follows), records such curiosities as:

When a coyote is heard barking, its name should not be uttered nor should it be scolded, lest that provoke it to attack.

It is thought that if a person scolds the rain it will not come when wanted.

And under the verb *-metzta*, which means "incapacitate, prevent, cast evil eye, sanitize, protect, cure or empower by magic," Laughlin lists such non-verbal advice as

"To ensure that a jaguar will not toss back one's bullets, a person sleeping in the woods will wrap the wad with three pubic hairs and three hairs from his arm pit and insert it in the rifle barrel, or he will simply break wind on the rifle."

or

"When a religious official or groom has a bull slaughtered their assistants bite the raw meat three times lest it be contaminated by the pregnancy of the wife or mistress of one of the party."

Under the same verb, he also offers such useful pieces of verbal artifice as:

"Raccoons may also be discouraged from entering the corn field if the farmer constructs a platform in the trees at the edge of the field, lies down on it, and calls out to the raccoons, "Let's sleep together." To protect a corn field in high wind, the owner will call out, "*tzotzan me kunen chob mu me xalomik `un*" /Be strong my little corn fields please do not fall down/. A person with gas on his stomach puts three crosses of ashes on it and says, "*tamo be Tuxta, tamo be Soktom*" /Take the Tuxtla road, take the Chiapa road/ so that the "wind" will leave."

Language, as a vehicle of social action, and as constitutive of social life, becomes the repository for all the normal sociological machinery. Among other things, as American anthropologists have known all along, language delicately probes such social categories as those of kinship. Here I refer not merely to denotational vocabularies of "kin terms" but more widely to the verbal signalling of the categories themselves. Again the most obvious

examples come from Aboriginal Australia where, as is well known, one must comport oneself--in speaking, as in other behavior--differently with different categories of kinsmen. In the GY case, to take the one I know best, a man cannot (our traditionally could not) speak at *all* to his mother-in-law; he must use a special respectful vocabulary with his wife's brothers or father; he must avoid certain everyday words with his sister; and he must use especially obscene or suggestive words with his classificatory grandfathers.³

Leach's widely read paper on "Animal categories and verbal abuse," demonstrated another way in which social categories are intertwined with language and verbal behavior, bringing our topic--the respectful, disrespectful, honorific, and generally deprecatives uses of language--squarely into the domain of one of anthropology's hoariest topics: taboo.⁴ In his classic treatment, Leach divides the language of obscenity into three broad categories:

- (1) "dirty words--usually referring to sex and excretion" [and, I may add, the body in some wider sense];
- (2) "blasphemy and profanity" [a rebound from a theory of the sacred]; and
- (3) Leach's special contribution, "animal abuse--in which a human being is equated with an animal of another species" (1964: 28).

Leach proposes, of course, that the candidate animals here are not random, but represent anomalies--gaps, confluences, confusions--in the categorical systems of a society, overlaid across different (typically human) domains sharing homologous dimensions: nature/culture, sexually accessible/sexually forbidden, edible/abominable, and so on. It is because speech is action that it must be analyzed as *other* behavior must.

The special prominence of *performance* and anthropological domains

When it comes to deprecatives in general--obscenity is a good example, because it often seems to evoke strong reactions--we begin to appreciate the special problems for analysis posed by the phenomena in question. Normal sorts of linguistic "intuitions" may be of limited value (there may be "limits of [metapragmatic] awareness" as Michael Silverstein has urged), in trying to figure out why (or whether) a certain turn of phrase will also give us a turn.

³Language also records other kinds of social status. Laughlin notes certain expressions in Tzotzil as "archaic": "[t]his means that they seem archaic to my younger informants who associate these words with the oldest living Zinacantecs." Vocabulary, in such a case, is a direct index of (social) history.

⁴Leach pointed out something we may forget in the privacy of our theoretical chambers but that we had better keep in mind on public occasions: that both linguistic and non-linguistic actions may call forth equivalent sanctions. "If at this moment I were really anxious to get arrested by the police, I might strip naked or launch into a string of violent obscenities: either procedure would be equally effective" (1964:24).

What is more, linguistic skills--*performance* skills--will vary radically, as all oldtimers know, so that the "ideal speaker-hearer" is again left denuded. The phenomena we are after are *located* in performance, not a component of it. In talking of honor and dishonor, anthropologically rich contexts cannot be ignored or idealized away.

Our analysis must specify the boundaries of appropriateness (writ large) for (dis)honorific behavior, as well as the features of context (writ small) to which it is oriented. Thus we move from whole events (like the Wolof weddings that Judith Irvine has elegantly described) which provide the platform for verbal abuse and insult, to the most delicate social features (a glimpse of slip showing, an indeterminate but disagreeable odor, the hint of foreignness, or what have you) as the things that can be signalled by honorific or deprecative language.

Finally, there are, as always, facts of genre (some admittedly fuzzy) which have to be teased out of any cultural tradition: in our own society we should perhaps want to distinguish gossip (malicious or innocent), praise, flattery, criticism (constructive or otherwise), abuse; reprimanding, scolding, joking, cursing, mocking, and so on. But the genres, and the corresponding contextual facts, may not match up well from one place to another. I shall be especially concerned with definitional or categorial issues in the case of Zinacantán, a much-studied Tzotzil speaking community in the highlands of Chiapas, Mexico.

A note about grammar

This sort of grubbing around in ethnographic concerns should not be too quickly dismissed even by syntactic hard-liners. Consider Ferguson's working hypothesis about the relationship between different functionally specialized language varieties and linguistic theory:

"If register variation is the tying of linguistic form to situational context, it may well be the case that human infants exhibit register variation even before they produce vocalizations recognizable as the beginnings of language. One aspect of language development, supported in studies of phonology, syntax, and lexicon, is the movement from situationally bound elements (e.g., words, sound complexes, formulaic routines) to decontextualized words, sounds, constructions, or forms of discourse that can be applied productively in new contexts . . . In an important sense, then, register variation may be seen not as a refinement in the use of language but as a principal source of language structure itself" (1982:58).

That we cannot separate the sorts of ethnographic matters I shall be talking about from the more orthodox concerns of grammar is a conclusion that leaps from the observation that the joking, mocking, scolding, and the like, are activities interwoven with such different linguistic domains as:

- (1) syntactic form, including morphology and supra-clausal grammar (the parallel form of Tzotzil couplets, appropriate to ritual, but also to emotionally charged denunciation, is a striking example we shall meet shortly);

(2) lexical structure, with all the obvious candidates codified in dictionaries under such headings as 'slang,' 'vulgar,' and 'obscene' (if not, 'formal,' 'stuffy,' and 'pedantic'--these latter less often codified--though perhaps exemplified--by lexicographers);

and (3) paralinguistic or "non-verbal" phenomena of various sorts (whether we believe in the implied dichotomy or not). Native theory is not silent here. GY speakers characterize polite BIL speech as "soft and slow," also (kinesically) "sideways," as opposed to common language which is "hard" or which can be pronounced "any way." In Tzotzil, the affective verb *-bulet* 'staring' encodes a native conception of impolite demeanor; Laughlin's gloss is "staring fixedly ([like an] impolite child)."

Euphemism

As I final theoretical preliminary, let me focus on a linguistic phenomenon, which clearly mixes linguistic form with both content and function: euphemism. Webster again makes plain the dual nature of the thing, telling us that etymologically *euphemos* is simply "auspicious or good-sounding speech." Herewith the definitions:

"1 : the substitution of an agreeable or inoffensive word or expression for one that is harsh, indelicate, or otherwise unpleasant or taboo." This reading catches nicely the *form* of things, a socially or culturally legislated order in which some words sound worse (or better) than others.

"2 : a polite, tactful, or less explicit term used to avoid the direct naming of an unpleasant, painful, or frightening reality." Here content--reality--is *there*; it can be "directly named." But, with euphemism, we simply refrain from calling a spade a spade.

Along with *euphemism* we shall presumably want to look for *dysphemism* as its strategic partner, in honorifics and deprecatives.

How do these things work? Let me begin by offering some abbreviated vignettes, designed to demonstrate that dysphemism has both a linguistic and a cultural face. By example, I will also show the sorts of thing that pique my anthropologist's curiosity.

- (i) After a Hopevale knife fight, in which a man attacked his sister's boyfriend, the sister yelled what crowd reaction showed to be a deadly insult: "You're not my brother, Maxie!"
- (ii) In Zinacanteco Tzotzil, the plainly vulgar *jlo`-tzo`* 'shit-eater', is a somewhat milder woman's equivalent of the insulting male expression *ik'al tz'i`* 'black dog.'
- (iii) I learned in Tonga that an awful thing to say to somebody is: "You eat at night."
- (iv) My Mexican mother-in-law evinced some bemused distress when I referred to an acquaintance as *mamona* ('snotty,' from *mamar* 'to suckle'); later, berating me for the gaffe, my mother-in-law's daughter explained that I should have said *sangrona* ('snotty,' from *sangrar* 'to bleed').

- (v) After a shoving match on the Reed basketball court, I muttered at my assailant "You asshole!" at which he shouted, in a seeming propositional non-sequitur, "I fucked your mother!"
- (vi) According to Ho Min Sohn, in Korean there is simply no second person pronoun for socially superior alters, "except in the marked case of fights."
- (vii) On the famous volleyball court of a Stanford think tank, an aging (and often cantankerous) academic revealed a certain loss of memory. One of his colleagues, mocking, remarked: "There's only one thing to say to that. *Tempus fugit* and *in vino veritas*."

There are ethnographic puzzles here--which I must leave the reader to ponder. However, they lead me to my primary materials, which may allow us to discover what linguistic and cultural commonalities there may be among deprecatives from separate parts of the globe.

Guugu Yimidhirr Brother-in-Law "language" as both "simplified register," and indexical system

My work on GY "Brother-in-law" language--the special respectful vocabulary one must use with certain affines in the area around Cooktown, in Northeastern Australia--is part of a large body of literature on the verbal indexing of social relationships for which Aboriginal Australians are celebrated. Briefly, a range of typified social relationships has a corresponding range of lexical items which index these relationships. Thus, at one end of the scale is a man's mother-in-law, whom he must treat with extreme care and respect--so much so that he may not talk to her *at all*. At the other end are partners in a joking relationship, with whom one must, whenever possible, use the most obscene and vulgar words available. In between are various gradations: ordinary "everyday" GY (in its various geographically appropriate dialects) to be used with most kinsmen and friends; a few special polite words that avoid sexual nuances which would be inappropriate, for example, between a man and his sisters; and, finally, the BIL vocabulary itself, which basically replaces common EV words with etymologically unrelated "deep" words, for use with the rest of one's wife's relatives.

The GY material has a singular advantage when we try to think about the verbal expression of honor, respect, and so on: the lexical mapping onto social relationships is highly codified and explicit. BIL language--though it is essentially an alternate vocabulary--looks like a separate *language* (or, at least, a situationally specific register, or subvariety)--which is what GY speakers say: "My language is double." We can *also* see why we should want to analyze the phenomenon as one of social *action* and *indexicality*.

On the one hand there are the register-like properties. The BIL vocabulary is highly reduced, semantically parsimonious, and generic--a characteristic that Dixon uses to motivate his nuclear/non-nuclear distinction in semantic description. It is also subject to selectional or collocational restrictions of a familiar kind: it would be incorrect for speakers to mix BIL with EV words in a promiscuous manner, inside a clause, for instance.

The indexical use of BIL is (or was traditionally), in Silverstein's terms, highly "presupposing." If my mother-in-law was on the path, I would go around the other way; if my father-in-law hove into earshot, I would switch to BIL words.

BIL vocabulary also builds in certain restrictions on "topic" or "denotation": I can substitute *gandul* for *galga* if I want to talk about spears with my affines, but no lexical substitutions will let me talk about vaginas.

These features lead, in folk understandings, to two sorts of native theorizing. First there is a denotational focus: BIL words are thought to be the referential equivalents of EV words, except that, in the latter case, "you can't use those words against your mother-in-law." Second, as I mentioned, BIL is elevated to the status of a separate "language," which is owned by those who still know it (a common enough kind of property in this polyglot society). Consequently, as I have written elsewhere, in a world where men no longer must avoid their mothers-in-law, the BIL words become available for different metapragmatic manipulations.

Notice that, when there is something you can't name directly, or whose EV name is insufficiently polite, BIL offers you two strategies: you can use a BIL word that doesn't have the same nasty ring to it; or you can talk around your subject, using generic BIL words and the ingenuity of your grammar to refer without ever really denoting. These are the two sides of euphemism, once again. In this highly codified Australian case, euphemistic recourse to verbal subterfuge, via BIL language, is particularly clear, and it is no surprise that Aborigines are proud of themselves for having it around.

Finally, honorifics vs. deprecatives

Our words often obscure the facts, but the primitive terms of this discussion cannot be taken as simple dichotomous opposites: if I do not honor you, do I (necessarily) dishonor you? Perhaps I do, if we are speaking Japanese. But the opposite of "polite," according to my students' intuitions at least, is not always "impolite." It may be "friendly," or "relaxed," or perhaps simply "neutral"--terms which seem to evoke distinct dimensions. Or the scale may be extended beyond these particular endpoints: to "rude," "outrageous," "vulgar," or "offensive" at the impolite end, and "respectful," or even "scrupulously correct" at what seems to be the polite end. Often--and this seems to be true in Tzotzil as in English--we may need to contrast joking with seriousness, informality with pedantry, or scolding with sociable argument. The multiple effects of both linguistic form and cultural practice need to be disentangled.

If politeness is self-effacing, indirect, self-deprecatory and so forth (with the appropriate Speaker and Hearer roles, and a calculus of strategies *a la* Brown and Levinson), what will be the appropriate model for insult? Will it be alter-effacing (belittling of one's addressee); or ironically (sarcastically) alter-aggrandizing?

We can always make up plausible sounding examples, but I should like to turn instead to some situated fragments of Tzotzil speech. As always, when we look at what people say, we find them both doing things, and talking about (in second order representative discourse) what they do, giving us a dual lens onto both practice and theory. Notice that for Zinacantecos, as for ourselves, self-effacing humility is often taken as

rhetorical *fishing* for praise: I criticize myself, so that you, protesting, will honor me. Seemingly opposite or complementary mechanisms dance together, much as Brown and Levinson would predict.

Here is one scene. Several drunken Zinacantecos are discussing a political dispute in which they have just taken part. R, a young past municipal president, is annoyed that he was not supported by more of the elders (two of whom are currently drinking with him). R is a proud man, but he appears to belittle himself, in parallel Tzotzil constructions, mixed with inebriated Spanish.

{1}

- 1 r; pero hay una cosa noxtok un
But there's another thing.
- 2 mu stak' mi yech mi kiloj
It won't do if (I say) "have I truly seen
- 3 mu yechuk mi kiloj li jpas-`abtel
"or haven't I truly seen the cargoholders."
- 4 mu stak' xichi un=
I can't say that.
- 5 m; =va`i un
That's right
- 6 p; [yech a`a eso yech a`a
That's right, yes, that's right.
- 7 m; [yech a`a
Yes that's right.

Here (mock) humility is a trigger for praise. R's exaggerated assessment of his own lack of direct experience--"I can't say that I know about religious service"--prompts his interlocutors to go on eventually to contradict him with praise: "Perhaps you shouldn't make such a bold claim openly, but of course, you *do* know about it, because of your past political service."

The same rhetorical dialectic can be employed in second order discourse, *reported* or *represented* humble speech. Later in the same drinking session (when R has, finally, passed into a speechless stupor and the two elders carry on alone), P conjures an imaginary scenario in which explicitly abusive and insulting talk (dramatically portrayed) is *countered* with humble and self-deprecatory explanation. Again, the issue is how a man who has done no religious service can presume to speak as an authority.

{2}

- 1 p; k'u cha`al =
How-
- 2 avil k'u cha`al achan yech ti k'u xaval =
did you see! how did you learn, what you are saying
 =[]
- 3 m; ta yech ta mu yechuk
right or wrong (i.e., indifferently)
- 4 = k'u yu`un chatik' ave mu x`utate mo`oj
why do you stick your mouth in?--he won't be told that, no.

- 5 p; [k'u ma cha'al =
Why indeed -
- 6 =chaval yech mi'n achanoj yech bu aviloj
on earth do you say that? Have you learned? Where did you see?
- 7 m; [aa, mo'oj
Ah, no.
- 8 p; muk' bu xakil o un kere:
I have never seen you, boy!
- 9 m; [mu me x'ale yech a'a
No he won't be spoken to like that, indeed.
- 10 p; **toti:k**
"Sir..."
- 11 m; [ji ji
right, right
- 12 p; **kaltik ava`i**
"Let me tell you..."
- 13 m; [mo'oj
no
- 14 p; **ja` yech li`ech' ta ch'ay k'ak'al**
"This is how I devoted my time..."
- 15 ech' ta preserenteal
"I had a term as president."
- 16 kilojo oe k'u tzpas li jtotik moletike
"As a result I saw what the father elders do."
- 17 jtotik jme`tik
The fathers, the mothers.

This *representation*, both of the insult and of the polite rejoinder it inspires, clearly shows that, in (implicit) Zinacanteco theory at least, paired or complementary phenomena--insult and respect, abuse and politeness--have typical manifestations in speech.

Tzotzil: non-codified speech varieties

By contrast with Australian Aborigines, when it comes to codified "metapragmatics," Zinacanteco Tzotzil speakers seem to find themselves in a haphazard situation. Laughlin, timidly, puts forwards several putative "speech categories." Here is how he introduces his remarks:

Lacking a knowledge of native categories of speech, I have essayed, nevertheless, to delimit with slightly greater precision the context of certain vocabulary entries by inventing a number of speech categories whose degree of reality varies considerably (1975: 28).

He goes on to mention "archaic" words, and "baby talk," before getting to the categories that concern us most directly.

[Some] entries are labelled as pertaining to "male speech" or "female speech." While I am not positive that such expressions are used exclusively by men or by women, I know that they are spoken predominantly by men or by women. Again, entries labelled "male joking speech" may perhaps be used appropriately by drunken women, but they are associated primarily with cantina talk or with male joking situations during ritual or at work. "Polite speech" and "scolding speech" have been used characteristically when one wishes to make a graceful remark or to upbraid another. They have no particular structure and are less real categories than the above.

Laughlin means to contrast these "less real" categories with what he goes on to label "ritual speech" and "denunciatory speech," both of which are framed in the parallel couplet form of prayer and song. Because exactly the same forms (and the same "stereoscopic" images, encoded in standard word pairs) occur in both ritual activities and, say, "in self-righteous declamations at home or at the courthouse," Laughlin groups together the two labels--"ritual speech" and "denunciatory speech"--which thus "distinguish what we would consider to be two different contexts for the same speech phenomenon, but which I would venture Zinacantecs consider as a single context." Tzotzil parallel language has been widely described, so I will have little to say about it here, except to note, in my final remarks, that it does occur in deprecative contexts, too.

In Laughlin's defense, there is evidence in normal conversation that his categories have folk salience. Indeed, the categories underlie explicit theory about talk, its motives, and its consequences. Consider the wise--if somewhat fatalistic--words of a dispute settler L, who speaks to his cousin A after the latter has beaten his wife in a jealous, drunken rage. He blames the liquor for the beating but, it seems, blames only the inevitable nature of things for the fighting itself. The notion of "scolding" is basic to the rhetoric.

{ 3 }

- 114 1; k'al muk' jtik' li poxe stak'
when we don't get into liquor we can
- 115 jk'uxubin jbatik
take care of one another
- 116 bweno ta melel vo`otik
well, it's true, we..
- 117 syempre ono o kut jbatik bak'intik a`a pero
always have to argue with one another sometimes, true
- 118 sta to yora noxtok
but it only happens from time to time
- 119 a; an yech che`e
why, that's so
- 120 1; utel nox
but just scolding
- 121 ma`uk majel ta ora
not punching right away

Words, in L's opinion, may hurt less than blows (or, as our manifestly false proverb would have it, sticks and stones), but they still hurt.

{ 4 }

- 78 1; ta melel li utele
truly, as for scolding
79 tey ono nan bak'intik k'ux jset'uk a'a
it always hurts a little, from time to time

Nonetheless, verbal fights should be ephemeral: they should pass.

{ 5 }

- 89 1; =ta melel syempre o no nan k'u xkut o jbatik =
truly there's always something to fight about
90 =jp'el cha'p'eluk
one word or two words
91 pero ta jlikel o lek
but in a moment, things are good again
92 jk'opon jbatik noxtok
we talk to each other again

Scolding talk, *utel*⁵--even just "one or two words" of it--here clearly contrasts with normal sociability, also couched in verbal terms, *jk'opon jbatik* 'talking to each other.'

So "scolding" does seem to be a Zinacanteco category, which includes a verbal manifestation. Once a system of indexicals, whatever it signals, "exists"--that is, once it becomes (consciously) available in the native scheme of things--it becomes subject to Ferguson's "universals" for register variation (1978, in Greenberg, et al.). Ferguson legislates the matter this way (and I have appended some comments):

- a) Every language has register variation. (Doesn't this simply mean that indexicality is everywhere?)
- b) Any register may be extended to secondary uses. (Indexing an index can, in turn, index something else.)
- c) A given register is variable in extent of deviation from the least marked 'natural' form of the language. ('Unmarked' form is the natural--that is, iconic--index of the unmarked.)
- d) Children acquire competence in register variation as they acquire the basic grammatical structure of their language; and (e) registers are transmitted and changed as part of the total structure of language. (Read: linguists can't ignore indexical phenomena, whatever they may have been told.)

What Ferguson calls "registers" here represent clumps of indexicals, with certain commonalities of form, function, and denotation, so grouped because they "go together with" a characteristic "situation."

⁵ The root *ut-* means "say."

Laughlin's categories--quite characteristically for "categories of speech" seen as Fergusonian registers in our own metalanguage--involve the systematic conflation of quite distinct matters: formal "genres," substantive content, and contextual appropriateness in a social or cultural (if not political) sense. Many of these putative speech categories are interwoven with honorifics and their opposites. It is these intertwinings that I shall consider in the rest of this paper.

Male and female speech

Laughlin's male and female categories remind us that speech implicitly asks (and perhaps answers) the question: who am I (and who are you)? That question has no universal (i.e., non-cultural) answer, and probably no deferentially bleached one, either.

Laughlin's entries show, for example, that Zinacanteco males have a monopoly on the vulgar root *-kob* which refers to sexual intercourse; little boys in Nabenchauk, anxious to distinguish themselves from their predominantly female surrounds, begin to exploit this monopoly rather young, in verbal acts which proclaim: "I am a man, and *I* can say *this*." They thus simultaneously separate themselves from, and assert their dominance over, mothers, aunts, and sisters at a quite early age.

Men, according to the dictionary, also have exclusive rights to another male word, *mis* 'female genitals.' (Leach would not be surprised to learn that it can also mean "pussycat.") Indeed, Laughlin gives an impressive list of "vagina" expressions, many of them onomatopoeic, characteristic of "male joking speech." Leach found the category of bodily and sexual obscenity unproblematic and probably universal, appealing to human psychology for an explanation. But the processes of eu- and dys-phemism are clearly having a field day in the part of the Tzotzil lexicon that deals with female sexual organs. The following examples are drawn from Laughlin (1975). (I apologize to any sensitive Tzotzil ears or eyes I may offend by them--I offer them here in the interests of science.)

{6}

jun ta na tuktuk. (*as big as a woodcreeper's burrow*) very large vagina.
k'el avi st'oxlej ye. *Look at the size of her mouth /vaginal/.*
be ch'ich', (*path of blood*) vagina.
bojbenalil, *cut /tree/; vagina.*
bojboj, *cut open, gashed (tree); gashed /vaginal.*
boset, *heaping (bowl), bulging (fly); bulging (vagina).*
ch'en, *hole, burrow, den, cave, ravine, cliff; vagina.*
chotlebal chon, *lit., seat animal, i.e., vagina.*
katu', *cat; vagina.*
kitzkitz, *vagina. (kitz = to gash, scratch)*
la'obil, *fork of tree used to secure object for bending or straightening; vagina.*
latz', *vagina. (latz' = to pinch between fingers)*
lutlut, *vagina. (lut = scarred or ribbed)*
mut'el, *pursed (ass), referring to vagina; pursed.*
mux, *vagina. (mux = snub-nosed, toothless)*
muxuk' *vagina. (same root)*
nak'balal chon, *lit., hidden animal, i.e., vagina.*
patz', *corn tamale /wrapped and divided in middle by corn leaf/. ; vagina.*
pik', *vagina. (pik'' = toothless? grease-stained?)*
sak-bojan, *white-slitted (vagina).*
setset, *round, circular, referring to vagina.*
taria, *unit of work; twelve acts of intercourse a night /said to be demanded by some wives/. For hoeing: 2 x 20 arm spans if land is unbroken, 5 x 10 arm spans if land has been hoed previously. For weeding; 5 x 20 arm spans. For planting; a day's work /the amount of corn seeded varies according to desire of workers/.*
tzajal ve'lil, *chitlings; vagina. (lit: red food)*
tzininet, *buzzing (ears), binding (tumble, sandals); snug (vagina).*
xalu', *cat; vagina.*

Again, native meta-theory can be relied on to make explicit this link between marked lexicon, gender, and sexual innuendo. Just as *tzisan* 'pubic hair' is a metaphor for "racy language," so too does Laughlin cite the following joking expression, appropriate for referring to a foul-mouthed man:

{7} naka no'ox mis chak skatz'oj⁶ k'al xlo'ilaj. *He just holds pussy and ass in his mouth when he talks.*

Men have no monopoly on abusive words for female genitals, however, although the connotations may be different. Female speech includes the word *-etel* 'vagina' which carries strong imputations of laziness. Women may say, insultingly:

{8} yetel nox li antze. *The woman has just a vagina, i.e., She does not know how to work.*

⁶ The verb *-katz'*, again not surprisingly, incorporates indirect animal abuse; it means 'hold sideways in the mouth'--as, a dog with a bone.

Joking speech

Joking implies both "funny" content--however that is to be characterized--and perhaps what we might call, remembering Irvine's cautions, "informal" situations. (In fact, we often think of "joking" as *lightening* up an otherwise heavy event.) It is common, even in formal settlement of marriage disputes in Nabenchauk, for elders to try to divert angry outbursts--even justifiable ones--by introducing mocking jokes.

In the following scene from a marriage dispute, Loxa heaps abuse on her husband (who lies nearby, sick, with a vicious hangover.) Too much such abuse does not serve the dispute settlers' ends--they are after reconciliation of the couple rather than a ratified total breakdown--but they are hard pressed to disarm Loxa's rhetoric. They finally do so with a joke.

{9} Antun1

136 lo; manchuk xa li totil ulo` jna`tik
if it hadn't been for the old Chamula, who knows?

137 p; [hehh

138 l; [hehh

140 l; ti manchuk li` li kulo` mole muk' bu x`eanvan
*if it hadn't been for the Chamula, no one could
have carried him*

141 p; [kere, manchuk li`
damn, lucky for him!

142 bal to
just as well..

143 lo; mu sna` yu`un vo:kol yu`un (...)
he doesn't know how hard it was

144 p; [bal to me stojbe sk'ak'al to
*just as well he had paid (the
Chamula's) wages*

Lo, the wife, rails that her husband Antun, in the depths of his shameless drunk, was hauled home by a Chamula--an Indian from a neighboring village which most Zinacantecos think of as a community of oafish bumpkins, given to excessive drinking themselves. The elders, L and P, try to counter Lo's invective with a defusing joke. L makes a (somewhat tired) pun on the word *ulo`* 'visitor' (which Zinacantecos and Chamulas use reciprocally as address terms for each other), but adding a 1st person possessive prefix, to produce *kulo`*, a homophone with a vulgar Spanish word for 'anus'--typical male joking speech. P makes joking reference to the fact that the Chamula in question was originally one of Antun's hired cornworkers, although he *hadn't* been paid to haul his employer around. His language, especially the use of the exclamation *kere* 'boy!', also carries a humorous tone, showing that the elders don't (want to) take the wife's outrage too seriously.

- 14 p; aa xi la le me`ele
"Ah," said the old lady.
- 15 ee mu`yuk to ya`el
"Eh, not yet, I think."
- 16 mu to ta jlajes
"I won't finish it just yet."
- 17 yiluk yil teyuk to mas tz'akal ta jlajes xi
"Never mind, I'll finish it later," she said.
- 18 j; teyuk to
"Later on."
 [
- 19 l; ha ha ha
 [
- 20 p; tey pachal ikom-
There it stayed served.
- 21 tey pachal ikom sbek'tal kajvaltik
Our Lord's flesh stayed there served (on the plate).
- 22 ta la
 [
- 23 j; xchi`uk svinoe
with it's wine.
- 24 p; ta la- ha ha
- 25 tal la li me`el tzna une
Then the old women came back to her house.
- 26 mye:rta xi la li me`el une
"Shit!," said the old woman.
- 27 mu xa xbat xa
She never went back again.
 [
- 28 a; (laughter)

There is also outright obscenity, with rather different effects, in the following exchange: a sacristan and a drunkard mock each other, while a ceremony is going on outside the Nabenchauk church. The political affiliations of these men--belonging to the major warring factions in town--also produces a certain subcurrent of violence, which surfaces in an aggressive exchange under the veil of vulgar jokes.

The interpenetration of deprecatives and joking speech is particularly (perhaps universally) obvious in the deliberate joking use of obscenity, the framed-as-humorous effect of an inappropriately crude remark. In fragment {10}, in the context of a formal meal in a traditional (Catholic) household, a man describes the unspeakable activities of evangelical Protestant Zinacantecos who have been driven from the community. A woman, thinking of joining the sect, has gone to the new protestant village, and, while supposedly blindfolded, sees a huge black dog (remember the black dog?) enter the room where God is supposed to appear, and vomit on a plate. The "sacristan" then unbinds her eyes and invites her to take a diabolical communion.

{10}

- 1 p; bweno tal xa li sbek'tal li kajvaltike
Then the flesh of Our Lord was brought.
- 2 komo ostya xkaltik
It was what we might call the Host.
- 3 chak' li totik pagre li jostya hhhhe
Just like the priest offering the Host.
- 4 l; iiii
- 5 p; ja` chalek' li
"You must lick this."
- 6 l; [ha ha ha
- 7 p; [ja` cha-
You must-
- 8 chalo` li-
you must eat this.
- 9 l; [ha ha ha
- 10 p; ja` chalo` li sbek'tal li kajvaltike
You must eat the flesh of Our Lord.
- 11 j; jiijo
damn!
- 12 p; xxe puta tz'i` un
It was fucking dog vomit.
- 13 j; ha ha

Having left his dinner companions thoroughly disgusted, P now presses home his moral--the total degeneracy of the Protestants, who are nonetheless outwitted by this crafty old woman. His tone is ironic.

{11}

- 1 d; ali me`ele, bal xka`i pero yu`un
I'm satisfied with just old women, because..
- [
- 2 p; anch'an me un
Just shut up!
- 3 d; an me ch'an uk vo`ot ali pixkal
Why YOU just shut up, too, sacristan.
- 4 an me ch'an uk kere an me ch'an
You shut up, too, boy, shut up!
- 5 p; k'opono li jch'ul moletike
Speak to the holy elders!
- 6 te chlo`ilaj chava`i te chlo`ilaj
They are conversing, you understand, they're conversing.
- [
- 7 d; jak'bo ka`tik rason k'usi =
Ask their advice about what-
- 8 =chal
they are saying.
- 9 an ch'an un pixka:l
Shut up, sacristan!
- 10 mi xana` pixkal..
Do you know, sacristan-
- 11 ali pixkale
The sacristan...
- 12 mi sna` van spik' i mis li pixkaletik le`e che`e
Do those sacristans perhaps know how to touch pussy?
- 13 pixkale mi sna` van spik' li puta mis le`e
Does that sacristan know how to feel goddamned pussy?

By this point, with tempers rising, the *pixkal* and the rest of the officials simply decided to ignore these crude taunts, as the drunk is clearly able to perceive. Notice that he explicitly changes footing, switching from 2nd to 3rd person references between lines 10 and 12, as he loses his target as a "cooperative" addressee.

Tzotzil joking makes massive use of body-part expressions, which seem to have a humorous, and very often deprecatative, power all their own. The following exchange comes from a gossip session in which people remark that a particular man has few known foibles other than his drinking.

{12}

- 1 p; =slo`iltael e ja` no`ox albat ti toj ep chak' pox
The gossip about him is that he drinks lots of booze.
- 2 ep tzk'an yuch-*
He wants to drink a lot-
- [
- 3 ca; ja` no`ox ti: kiloj ti batz'i k'ex .
I've only seen that he just always..
- 4 sna` xlok' sim xyakub
has snot coming out when he drinks.

Humorous nicknames, based on body parts combined with ridiculous epithets or images, have a similar, seemingly inherent, insulting capacity, as the continuing gossip illustrates.

{13}

- 1 p; ja` no`ox .
He's only
- 2 tzurukuk sat Maryan Pulivok xutik xka`i=
"screech owl face Mariano Pulivok" as I hear them call him.
- 3 cn; = ((laughs))

Scolding

Let's turn our attention to Laughlin's category of "scolding speech." In marital squabbles, in the midst of serious scolding and argument, joking use is also frequently made of body parts. In the following extract from another dispute settlement, where a jealous husband has beaten his wife who now sues for divorce, the elders appeal to a kind of male pride in the guilty husband. How did it look, they asked him, to be accompanied by an obviously battered woman?

{14}

- 1 l; mi ja` chak'an ame`elal tijil ta apat xanav
Is what you want that your wife walk behind you
- 2 p'ejp'ej xa sat mi lok'em xa ye k'usi
with just one eye or with her teeth knocked out or something
- 3 all; ((laughter))
- 4 l; jk'antik lek (k'an-tuch') xi jav
(Do we) want her all bruised up like this?
- 5 mu ya`uk ali . majbil k'usi ya`el ka`uktik
We don't want her all beaten up, after all.
- 6 ta jk'antik lek chixanavotik ta cha`vo`
We want to walk around well, both of us.
- 7 mi xak'an ti p'ejp'ej xa sat xa . tijil ta apat =
Or do you want her following you around with one eye knocked out
- 8 =ame`lal une
...Your wife?
- 9 r; tzobo me stojol li ya`ale kere
Get together the price of some liquor⁷ for her, boy!
- 10 ak'o xakolese
So that you can get her cured.

⁷ The reference is to the cost of liquor to be used both to beg the wife's forgiveness, and also to offer the curer who will heal her.

Scolding routinely uses body part expressions, including those based on the root *e* 'mouth'; these include abusive expressions that denote scolding speech itself. Here are more examples from Laughlin.

{15}

jach'ulanbe `e, *keep shooting off one's mouth.*

livet `e, *stretching mouth / when drunk or child is yelling/. (See the scolding expression mi*

livil no `ox ave ta yuch'el pox. Is your mouth stretched from drinking cane liquor?)

ein chak, (Literally, "Use your ass as your mouth.") generally between women; accusing person of refusing to tell the truth.

Also, notice the insulting implicature inherent in the expression *pik'obil chak*, a dysphemism for 'hand' (but literally, "implement for touching the ass").

That such implicatures are present is of course evidence for the fact that the systematic properties of normal "polite" discourse are inevitably exploited in the realm of deprecatives, too. One might have supposed that, when it comes to fights, the notions of (rational) cooperation, and indeed, of order--that is, orderliness as opposed to disorder: "cooperative" principles and maxims, turn-taking systematics, strategies, etc. upon which much of modern discourse analysis is based--might be suspended or altered.

But only some sort of Gricean maxims, under what some analysts have called the "brooding presence" of the Cooperative Principle, can explain the irony in scolding speech like that of the following Laughlin examples:

{16} *mi xatonin 'Will you lay an egg?' (Said to someone who wants to eat too many eggs.)*

Or

{17} *mi xachi`in avol 'Are you accompanying a child? i.e., Are you pregnant?' (Said to a youngster who eats incessantly.)*

Similarly, only inference triggered by implicature will energize the irony or sarcasm in argumentative evidentials in overt Tzotzil fights. In the following shouting exchange from a court case, A charges C with lying or misremembering; he gets a sarcastic response, which depends for its proper interpretation on just the sort of evidentially marked inference (see Haviland [198?]) that operates in calmer, more overtly cooperative circumstances.

{18}

15 a; mi ja`uk bu ikil taj x`elan k'ope
I didn't even see that whole fight

16 mu k'u la ta xkal, ch'abal, ch'abal
Everyone says that I didn't say take any part in it, none, none

17 c; sna`oj a`a
He knew, indeed.

18 a; ora ke taj ijpuj la ta tek'el chale
As for this suggestion that I kicked him, as he says

19 pero mo`oj un
But, I didn't

- 20 c; pero mu`nuk chapujon ta tek'el
But it wasn't that you kicked me
- 21 xi atek'u lavoqe ((stamps))
You stamped your foot this way
- 22 a; ali x`elan chavale
What you're saying
- 23 pero mo`oj, mo`oj
But, no, no.
- 24 c; **yu`van** mu teyuk jset' jch'ulel li vo`on une
Do you suppose that I wasn't somewhat conscious then?

Irony, to function, elicits inference, which cannot be refused simply because interlocutors are at each others' throats.

Deprecatives also draw on the social order. Scolding, for example, suggests a claim to certain *rights*: rights to be *able* to "scold." (Compare "upbraid," "complain," and so forth, where the implicated footings are subtly different.) It is only in fights, and fights between people of rhetorically appropriate standing, that one sees unvarnished, direct contradiction: the height of Brown and Levinson's "bald on record" strategy. In the same court case, which had to do with a fight that broke out over A's accusations that C had sold his hamlet to the anthropologists (and in Chiapas, that almost seems plausible), there is this sort of unabashed trading of contradictions. The third person, P, is the municipal president, the chief magistrate.

- {19}
- 12 p; k'u cha`al mi batz'i ch'ayemot ajol ya`el
so, were you quite drunk, then?
- 13 a; ch'ayem che`e muk' bu xkil
Quite drunk. I didn't see anything.
- 14 c; muk' bu ch'ayem, kuxul
He wasn't drunk. He was sober.
- 15 a; k'u cha`al
How so?
- 16 mi`n utvanej ta jpas ti yiloj kajvaltik
Was I then scolding people, as God is my witness?
- 17 p; yu`nox yech ti yu`nox cha`ilin
But it must be true that you were getting angry
- 18 ko`ol o chava`i titey chk'ot li gringoetik a`a
That you were annoyed that the gringos were there.
- 19 a; muk' bu xkal
I never said that
- 20 c; k'u ma yu`un x`elan aval jchonoj sjunlej parajel =
What? Why did you say that I had sold the entire hamlet,
- 21 =un che`e
then?
- 22 p; pero yu`nox oy taj sk'ak'al avo`on une
So you must have had some anger in your heart
- 23 a; an much'u ikalbe un
Why, to whom did I say that?
- 24 c; vo`on chavalbon, much'u ma chavalbe un
To ME you said it, who else?

25 a; an k'u ma ora lakalbe un
Why, when did I say that to you?

The issue of drunkenness and truth relates to the Zinacantec view that inebriation, and its accompanying blissful unawareness, represents a partial defense for wrongdoing under the influence. (See Collier (1975).) Nonetheless, among (adult) Zinacantecos, it is only when cornered, as at the courthouse, that people fail to disguise the naked hostility of their oppositional moves.

The orderliness of sequence is also explicitly exploited in scolding and fighting; though I will not take to time demonstrate it here, there seem to be special rules of turn-taking in fights, so that people feel unconstrained from breaking in, shouting down, and brusquely telling people to shut up. (Recall the sacristan and the drunk, above.) Moreover, fights can involve explicit manipulation of sequencing; sequence may become an overt meta-topic, subject as well to repair.

{20}

8 x; pero ch'abal
That didn't happen
9 mi mu kilojtikotikuk ti ja` jchi`il ta tramporero
Didn't we all see it, since we were all companions, playing the drums?
10 m; mu xatik' abaik
don't butt in!
11 t; tuk' xajak'beik un yu`van
Ask them about it properly

And later,

{21}

4 t; yu`van jyakubelot
Do you mean to claim you were drunk?
5 ti kuxulon vo`on k'alal x`elan xavalik une
Since I was quite sober when you all were saying that
6 yu`un batz'i chopol tajmek ya`el
It was very bad.
7 a; ak'o slajesik ba`yuk li jchope
Let the one group finish first
8 p; ja` lek a`a
Yes, that would be better
9 ak'o slajesik ba`yuk
Let them finish first
10 mu jayuk ka`itik k'alal stzob sbaik
We can't make any progress when everyone starts talking at once

Though I will not develop the evidence, within the domain of Tzotzil scolding one sees not only special lexical effects, but also manipulations of sequence--the domain of what one might call conversational micro-politics.

There are also, unsurprisingly, deprecatory devices in grammar and derivational morphology. Laughlin(1975:26) describes a specific stem class of "affective" verbs:

Affective verbs are used characteristically in narrative description with a certain gusto, a desire to convey a vivid impression. They have dash. Their specific semantic value, however, is not easy to ascertain. . . . CVC-*et* emphasizes permanence, a single location, and a state of neglect or abandonment. CVC-*Con* intensifies the particular state of the root. It may stress the slowness or ponderousness of its motion, the ineffectiveness or repetition of an action, the loudness of a noise.

Similarly there are adjectives derived from positional roots which are clearly *designed* for deprecation.

. . . They are a reduplicated CVC, a CVC-*VI*, and a CVC-*el*. The first two are semantically similar. The former seems to have greater immediacy, being used to describe an object before one's eyes or, like affective verbs, to convey an emotional reaction. . . . CVC-*el* is used invariably in derogatory remarks tossed at another person, e.g., *banel ajol* "You are bald!"

We discover the effective snideness of such devices in the marital dispute, already peeped at, in which the wife ridicules her husband for having to be hauled home by a Chamula drinking companion. This is how she describes the event:

{22}

- 1 k'al skuchet to le`e
When he was still getting hauled--
- 2 yu`un ulo`etik pe:ro tz'ukul ta o`lol
by the Chamulas, but he was hanging upside down between them
- 3 bu tajmek tz'ukul une
Why, he was just completely upside down.

There is both an affective verb in *-et*, based on the root *kuch* 'carry (as a load on ones back)'; and there is a derived adjective, from the positional root *tz'uk* 'upside down' or 'balanced precariously on a small base.' These roots are denotationally critical, but the deprecatory morphology is withering.

Polite speech

Politeness seems to rest on the possibility of crossing some boundary: going too far, asking (or risking) too much, stepping on toes. Politeness allows one to step back from or insulate oneself from these frontiers. As the Brown and Levinson formula makes explicit, in politeness theory we confront familiar issues of power and status.

Polite speech in Tzotzil employs both formal and referential euphemism. There are the familiar honorific lexical scales, moving in both directions. At a formal meal one does not *pok* 'wash' one's hands, but rather *jax*-es them, using a high sounding verb; by contrast, if I am offering food I will invite you not to *ve* 'eat' it, with an unmarked verb, but to *ten* it, to 'throw it down' as something insignificant. To avoid self-aggrandizement, I do not announce that my house is 'built'; rather I will say modestly that it manages to stand unsteadily (*vech*), that it sags (*xov*), that it barely shelters or surrounds me (*joy*).

It remains only to show how "polite speech" in Tzotzil--Laughlin's category tied to occasions "when one wishes to make a graceful remark"--intersects and interacts with deprecatives. Notice first, that there can be polite *scolding*. To soften the blow, when the dispute settlers feel they are nearing resolution of the fight in the case of the man who left his wife with broken teeth and a swollen eye, they temper their scolding and threats with euphemism, as in the following fragment.

{23}

- 1 r; yan li arsyale mu xakak'ba`a komo mu: stak' yech pero
I won't WHIP you, because that's not permitted but
- 2 x; [pero
- 3 r; pero chukele ti abtele ta xa onox cha`abolaj bi a`a
But you will do the favor of being jailed, of working, of course
- 4 tey xatzob .
You will gather up-
- 5 x; yech che`e
That's right.
- 6 r; [juteb pat-lo`bol ta parke te xa onox ()
-up a few banana peels there in the plaza,⁸
- 7 x; [an yu`nan . tey =
Why perhaps so-
- 8 =ch`ech' yu`un skoj mulil un=
-that's how your crimes will be forgiven.
- 9 r; =pero k'u chkutik un=
but there is no help for that
- 10 x; =yech
right

Scolding can also be tempered, turned into constructive criticism--even when it employs the marked mocking forms of body-metaphor and morphology we have met--by clever indirection. One of the elders gives the drunken husband, now nearly reconciled with his wife, a shaming moral lesson based on his *own* drunkenness.

⁸ This is a euphemistic reference to public shaming: being made to do community services as a garbage collector.

{24}

- 1 l; pero kremon to chka`i jba une
But I realized I was still young.
- 2 vale mas ke ta xkikta li poxe
It would be better if I gave up liquor.
- 3 mu jk'an ya`ell ti bu
I didn't want, it seems, that-
[
- 4 p; eso ja` o skanal xkom li poxe
Right, there's profit in leaving the liquor
[]
- 5 l; xvichvo:n k'ab ta =
My piss was just tinkling by-
- 6 =o`lol be une
the middle of the path.
- 7 yu`un mu jk'an un
and I didn't want that.
[
- 8 lo; k'exlal un yu`van lek une
That was shameful. Do you think it was good?
[
- 9 p; jkobe:l k'exlal
Damn! That was shameful!
- 10 lo; batz'i krixchano chk'elvan un
People would really watch.
[
- 11 l; k'exlal un chk'elvan ti antzetike
Shame! The women would be watching.
- 12 chk'elvan ti tzebetik ka`uk une
Even the girls would be watching!

Finally, even critical talk, can have its effects inverted by employing the devices of Laughlin's final speech category: ritual/denunciatory speech--the parallel couplet of prayer. When the man who, years later, got drunk with Chamulas was about to be wed, he received formal instruction from his wedding godfather. This ritual exhortation mentioned both his drinking (which had already begun) and the vaguely shotgun-nature of his wedding. The godfather, shown as M in the following extract, both upbraids Antun, and does so *gracefully*, by employing the most orderly form of Tzotzil, the ritual couplet. (I have eliminated all but the godfather's words.) The tone is thus sober, critical, and, ultimately, forgiving (although we have seen, from subsequent events, that this godfather's optimism was misplaced).

{25}

- 2 m; ak'o mi asa` amul lavie //
Even if you have gotten into trouble now //...
- 4 m; ak'o mi apas amul lavie
Even if you have committed a sin now.
- 7 m; pero lavie muk' --
But now there isn't...
- 8 ch'abal xa ti k'ope // ch'abal xa ti sti`e
There is no longer a dispute // there is no longer scolding

Having thus come full circle, from deprecatives back to the language of honor, I will stop, with the dispute settler's final couplet:

{26} ch'abal xa li k'ope// sikubem xa li k'ope
there are no more words, the words have cooled off.

I have tried to give an introductory glimpse of the richness, both in ethnographic detail and linguistic form, of the opposite end (or ends) of our honored topic.