TEXT 1989 VOLUME 9-1

In this issue

Return to John Heubacul

Copy # 2

TEXT

an interdisciplinary journal
for the study of discourse

editor

teun a. van dijk

'Sure, sure': Evidence and Affect[1]

JOHN B. HAVILAND

Abstract

When people fight, they typically display their feelings; and since people often fight over matters of fact, declarations of truth and accusations of deceit are frequent vehicles for affective language. I examine evidential devices in Tzotzil arguments, to display the complex formal and functional intermingling of referential usage (the normal accepted domain for questions of truth), rhetoric and genre (in particular, the highly charged formal speech style in Zinacanteco Tzotzil), illocutionary force, and affect. I conclude that (Tzotzil) conversation as much establishes a moral as a propositional universe of discourse, and that evidentials can be about feelings and commitments as well as about truth.

Fussing and fighting

On the radio, the Bickersons[2] are at each other again:

John: Blanche, what's the matter with you
it's three o'clock in the morning
You had a good time t'night
Now whyncha let me sleep?
Blanche: had a miserable time
it was the UNhappiest anniversary I ever spent
Why didn't you show up for the party, John?=
John: =I TOLD ya
I got stuck at the office
Blanche: I'd like to believe that
What were you doing?
John: working
Blanche: su:re sure
That's always the first excuse
If I don't fall for that?

You have a second excuse
then a third, and a fourth,
What were you working on?

John: a fifth
Blanche: you'd better not be so bold, John Bickerson.
        For YOUR information I got a call from . Louise Shaw
John: what about it?
Blanche: she saw you coming out of a saloon at midnight
        she Saw you now don't deny it=
John: =I'm not denyin it
Blanche: why were you coming out of a saloon at midnight?
John: because I had to come out SOMEtime
Blanche: I warn you, John
        you better give up that habit
        Every time you go into a saloon the devil goes in =
        =with you
John: well if he does he pays for his own drinks
        Good night
Blanche: Oh, no:
        what time did you leave the office?
John: I left the office at eleven o'clock=
        =I caught the bus at eleven five=
        =I got off at eleven fifty-four
        I stopped at the cocktail bar and bought a =
        =corkscrew
        and waited an hour
Blanche: why?
John: because it was pouring outside
Blanche: what were you doing?
John: pouring inside
        are you satisfied?
        Is that what you wanted me to say?=
Blanche: =NO, I just want the TRUTH

Harvey Sacks (1975) showed us that everyone has to lie, and I suppose the sad fact is that everyone has to *fight*, too. Those of us who manage to maintain decorum and clean knuckles, by staying out of physical brawls, may still get in (or suffer) our licks with words and shouting. What is more, not only are we all familiar with fights, we all know how it *feels* to fight. We express anger, annoyance, exasperation, impatience, disgust, disdain, and disrespect largely through the same channels that we use to recognize these things in others; and in many cases the channels are *linguistic*. Such emotive expressivity is often *tied* to language; it may inhere as much in emotively charged lexical items as in intonation; it may utilize everything from devices of syntax, such as anaphora and ellipsis, to

gestures; or it may exploit such disparate formal features of language as poetic parallelism and particles. Affective expression, on this view, is an integral part of the *design* of language as it emerges through verbal performance.

We also fight about the truth. In this essay, I want to relate verbal expressions of feeling, in fights and disagreements, to questions of information and evidence. I will show that, at least in some instances of verbal interaction[3], the basic techniques of contentiousness are inseparable from manipulation of what Jakobson (1957) labelled *evidentials*: categories of truth, reliability, and authority, relative to participants in the speech event[4]. This unsurprising conclusion illustrates once again the inherent plurifunctionality (Silverstein, 1985) of linguistic elements: a sentential particle of evidence, for example, may have referential content, but also encode illocutionary force, speaker indirection, and emotional affect. Widening the field to include non-verbal aspects of linguistic performance simply invites attention to the richness of this multifold layering of form and function.

When, inspired by Elinor Ochs's insistent urgings that we shed our referential biases, a group of us interested in language and social life begun to discuss affective language some years ago,[5] we struggled with both definitional and procedural questions. How much does our inquiry depend on having some primitive or culturally independent notion of 'emotion' or 'feeling' or 'inner state'? How far can one proceed with a comparative study of the inner life[6] by, say, cataloging the impressive variety of linguistic devices that *appear* to encode feelings or to communicate emotions, either intentionally or inadvertently, genuinely or conventionally? Doesn't language simply lead us astray, allowing human beings to cloak, mask, disguise, perhaps even to misperceive what beats in their hearts (or stirs in their livers, or bellies[7])?

If we start not with such definitional riddles but with ordinary talk— gossip, for example, or the exchanges of everyday conversation—it seems clear that routine and commonly available interpretive processes deal, in a natural way, with *feelings*. Consider, for example, *reports about* conversation. We can imagine people describing interactions in terms that make an implicit link between ways of talking and ways of feeling:

A: I spoke to George last night.
B: How was he?
A: He sounded bored.

Nor need such characterizations have recourse to explicit affective predicates. Substitute for the third line in this hypothetical conversation, the line 'His mother died', or simply 'He was crying,' and it seems clear

that there is (or at least *can* be) a clear intended message about George's state of mind. Partly this is a matter of drawing the correct sort of *inference*, driven in this case by an affectively pointed question ('How was he?').

Moreover, it is a commonplace of the conversational analysis of preference structure (see Levinson (1983) for a summary) that dispreferred turn contours can suggest dispreferred (i.e., marked) interpretations that go beyond what is *said*. Consider the possible effect of a two-beat pause in:

A: How are you?
B: (pause) OK.

Standard processes of implicature can produce inferential chains that lead to (among others) affective conclusions. Such implicature can be triggered by the familiar sorts of mechanisms, from conversational maxims to sequential organization.

Here is a slightly exotic, naturally occurring, example from a Tzotzil conversation between a Zinacanteco woman and her father. The narrator *recounts* a highly emotional scene in which a beaten wife sought help from a village authority. Without using an explicit affective predicate she conveys the wife's distraught state by couching her protagonist's speech in the particular marked form of Tzotzil ritual couplets, appropriate to righteous denunciation[8]:

(1)   (Compl.trs)[9]
   8   t: =ja' taj ali: . chul yal li ali yajnile=
        It was when . . his wife came here to say ...
   9   p: =aa
  10   t: ali albon jk'antik
        What we want is for you to tell him for me
  11   jch'amun ave jk'antik
        what we want is for me to borrow your mouth
  12   tzitzbon jk'antik
        what we want is for you to punish him for me
  13   k'u onox ti animal chismaje, animal chiyute
        how is it that he always beats me so much, scolds me so much?
  14   an timin ta'lo xiya'ie
        if he is tired of me
  15   tuk' xistak' ech'el
        He can just send me away properly.
  16   batz'i mu onox bu xtal li ali jlekile
        No goodness comes to me
  17   mu onox bu xtal ti utzile
        No well-being comes to me

  18   albon jk'antik un
        Please tell him for me.
  19   yu'un batz'i ta xa xicham o un, ta xa xilaj o un
        because I am really dying from it, I am being destroyed by it
  20   ti majele, ti utele.
        from the beating and the scolding.
  21   xi li x'i'on ta ti' na chka'i ja' ba ik' le'e
        That's what she said, crying at the doorway, when she went to get him.

Let me repeat: this is an *affective* report, of someone else's verbal performance. The speaker, marked T, overheard the beaten wife's original complaints as she came to the dispute-settler's house to ask for help, and she here puts the words back into her protagonist's mouth in a dramatic portrayal. A large part of the verbal performance is a kind of Goffmanesque or Bakhtinian *staging*: setting up the protagonists, seasoning their characters, evoking, rather than merely describing, the original situation. Furthermore, the affective expression involved may involve T's feelings about the events and protagonists she portrays, or the representation of the quoted speaker's putative feelings at the time of the narrated events, or both.[10]

Although this may not be obvious from the transcript, it is in large part the structure of parallel lines (augmented by a striking intonation that makes the words sound like a high-pitched, rhythmic wail) that helps convey the tone of distress, helplessness, and desperation that the beaten woman brought to her plea. Tzotzil ritual speech consists of couplets (occasionally triplets) of syntactically parallel lines which normally differ by only a single word or phrase. Such parallel structure in Zinacanteco speech is a frequent feature of scolding and denunciation.[11]

However, the ritual style can also be used for other expressive purposes. It is here an appropriate and powerful device that allows T to portray her protagonists's distraught state, in both word and style. T's rendition of this woman's talk starts in with parallel lines from the beginning. (She has a triplet in lines 10–12, with a repeated refrain at line 18, based on the word *j-k'an-tik* 'we want, we ask'; a couplet at line 13, 'he beats me so much, he scolds me so much'; another couplet at 16–17, 'no goodness, no well-being'; and a final couplet pair at 19–20, 'I die, I am finished, from beating, from scolding.') Her pleading with the village elder thus takes on a tone both insistent and pathetic, as she bemoans her fate and ill-treatment in a style that, for a Tzotzil audience, recalls the wailing entreaties that a sick person might address to the ancestors or the Lord of the Earth (Vogt, 1969; 1976).

Riddles of expressive language

There is an ordinary presumption, often shared by philosophers, that talk and verbal performance constitute primary or privileged evidence about how people are feeling. Contradictorily, there is also a common suspicion, bolstered by the authoritative pronouncements of psychologists and ethologists (see Bateson, 1968; Ekman, 1976; 1977), that words can lie, and that it is more often through non-verbal 'leakage' that people betray how they *really* feel.[12] (That there is a tension between these contradictory presumptions within 'common sense' may be seen by the fact that, on the one hand, people's word can be taken 'at face value,' whereas on the one hand, people's word can be taken 'at face value,' whereas proverbs teach us that actions speak louder than words.) There is often explicit theory linking speech and feeling. It may have an empirical flavor ('You can tell he's angry because his voice trembles' or '... because he gets all silent' or '... because he speaks in couplets'—or, contrarily, 'despite what he says') or a normative one ('I know you said you're sorry, but you don't *sound* [or *seem* or *act*] sorry'). In either case cultural speculation relates the inner life to its linguistic face.

This culturally recognized relation between inner states[13] and linguistic expressions can be both conventionalized, and potentially emancipated. Convention is clear in that part of the etiquette of language that codifies affective displays in talk. To show you are upset or angry, in Tzotzil, you can fall into couplets; in Guugu Yimidhirr, an Australian language, you can use the conventionalized style of the genre called *gaymbal* cursing.'[14] A culturally sanctioned symptom of one's feelings may be talking in a particular way. There can then be a further stage, in which the emotive style is set free from the emotion: like many signs, iconic or otherwise, the linguistic reflex can be emancipated from the real affect, since a conventionalized form of emotional expression often expresses only a conventionalized emotion. Thus, a professional mourner, or a Zinacenteco curer, can shed tears in intense prayer one moment, and snap straight-faced at a child or joke with a newcomer the next.

In this light, affect emerges as yet another component of fully situated natural language, which like many indexical features of speech, obliges us to go beyond the referential content of truth-functional semantics. We can show that affect, notionally, runs in a different realm from this sort of restricted reference by holding truth-value (more or less) constant and varying expressive content, with a variety of linguistic devices. Here is an example from the wee little baby bear:

Somebody has been sitting in my chair.
Somebody has been sitting in my fucking chair.
Some creep has been sitting in my chair.
Alguien estuvo sentadote en mi silla.

In this last sentence, from a Mexican baby bear who finds his favorite chair flattened and mussed by some obviously overweight presumed Goldilocks, the augmentative suffix *-ote* added to the participle *sentado* 'seated' conveys the bear's unfavorable regard for the unknown intruder.[15]

Without trying to provide details, let me note some important complexities. In the case of a Spanish diminutive, applied by speaker S to referent R in speech with hearer (addressee) H, there are several distinct possibilities: (i) S may be expressing a truth-conditional property of R. For example, *hermanito* 'brother + DIM' can, in some dialects of Spanish, refer to a *younger* brother, i.e., a 'little brother.' This is especially the case with, e.g., the Spanish of some Mexican Indians who thereby retain in Spanish a lexicalized distinction between older brother/younger brother that exists in their native language, but which is otherwise not lexically marked in Spanish.[16] (ii) S may express an affective relationship to R. (*Vamos en mi camioncito* 'We'll go in my little truck'—read 'my dear little truck') (iii) S may express an affective relationship to H. (¿Quién está acostadita aqui? 'Who is lying + DIM here?'—read 'I am speaking to dear little you,' since here H = R.) (iv) S may try to invoke, or create, an affective relationship with H. (*Beggar: Por diosito, dame un pesito.* 'For God + DIM, give me a peso + DIM.' Here: 'just a little peso,' and 'for dear little me.') And so on.[17]

Steve Levinson (1981) has argued that affective language typically combines what seem to be analytically separate axes. For example, he analyzes a verb like 'whine' in the following terms:

if A says B is *whining*, then B is half-crying (or evincing related emotions) and A has negative affect (disapproval) of this event. That is, the term is both descriptive of someone's inner state ... and expressive of the speaker's affectual attitude to that event ... Proably, most affect terms when properly analyzed have this sort of compound structure (1981).

The details require more study, but it seems reasonably clear that linguistic devices such as diminutives alter the conveyed affect, but do not noticeably affect truth-value. (Either someone, whether creep or fatso, has or has not been sitting in the chair.) So affect, like respect, attaches to speech, and takes advantage of grammar, but can run free of semantics in the strictest sense. This should not surprise us, if we have taken Malinowski and Austin seriously, for-if words are part of or equivalent to actions (Malinowski, 1935), then they can bear the same features as actions; and one thing humans do freely in action is display feelings.

Affect can thus be seen to be formally parallel to those features of

speech that index social relationships—honorifics, respect vocabularies, and the like (examples of *social deixis* in the terms of Levinson [1983, Chap. 2]—which can be variously grammaticalized and lexicalized, and which can both go beyond and contribute to referentiality.

Affect in speech also resembles non-referential indices in participating in a continuum from relatively 'creative' to relatively 'presupposing' (Silverstein, 1976). Here lies at least part of the possibly vexing issue of markedness and sincerity. A conventional display of sympathy, let us say, is not only the unmarked response to certain socially given situations (bereavement, for instance): it is contextually automatic for well-formed social action in such situations (just as Dyirbal mother-in-law words [Dixon, 1971] are automatic in the presence of one's mother-in-law). Deviations, where possible at all, are highly *marked*. In other circumstances, however, affective display is *creative*: it redefines a situation, or creates a new one, altering the parameters of future action. If I break down and weep, I may drastically alter the contexts in which I find myself.[18]

There are, finally, the complexities of affect in action. If the proper ground for affective language is in displays of feeling more generally, we need to pursue a wider theory of how and why human beings engage in such displays, linguistic or otherwise. Much philosophical hacking has exposed conceptual brambles that link different domains. 'Saying one is sorry,' for example, can be an instance of 'apologizing,' which is in turn related to (but clearly different from) 'making excuses'—a moral act typically performed in speech, as Austin (1961) urged long ago. The affect (the display of sorrow) accomplishes only part of the job, albeit an important part. (One can apologize [and even say one is sorry] without being sorry—basketball players do it all the time—but simply 'being sorry' goes a long way as an apology.)

Moreover, just as we have freed ourselves from an Augustinian model (Wittgenstein, 1952) in which an utterance is merely a map of some internal speaker's meaning, waiting to be mapped back onto hearer's meaning, so can we presumably reject a simple mechanical view of the relationship between the speaker's psyche and the speaker's words (or between inner states and outward signs). If speaker S utters utterance U, containing 'affect markers' for emotion E, we need not simply conclude that S feels E, but perhaps such alternatives as: (i) S tries to persuade hearer H that S feels E; (ii) S tries to persuade H that E is appropriate; (iii) S tries out E to see how it feels, looks; (iv) S gives vent to E; (v) S consciously displays E to H; (vi) S is testing his perception that H expects E; and so on. Such wrinkles and muddles should convince us that we need to return to real life for empirical succor.

Expressive structure in language

A logical place to look, if one is interested in how language allows us to fight, disagree, or simply be *disagreeable*, is in the opposite sort of situation: being polite. Brown and Levinson (1978, 1986) have given us a detailed look at some linguistic features of politeness. Moreover, the Red Queen[19] shows us that polite (correct, acceptable, inoffensive, and generally agreeable) conversation may also involve *more* than simply what one has to *say*.

'Where do you come from?' said the Red Queen. 'And where are you going? Look up, speak nicely, and don't twiddle your fingers all the time.'

Alice attended to all these directions, and explained, as well as she could, that she had lost her way.

'I don't know what you mean by *your* way,' said the Queen: 'all the ways about here belong to *me*—but why did you come out here at all?' she added in a kinder tone. 'Curtsy while you're thinking what to say. It saves time.'

Alice wondered a little at this, but she was too much in awe of the Queen to disbelieve it. 'I'll try it when I go home,' she thought to herself, 'the next time I'm a little late for dinner.'

'It's time for you to answer now,' the Queen said, looking at her watch: 'open your mouth a *little* wider when you speak, and always say "your Majesty".'

If these techniques, among others, help speakers to be polite, then it ought to be possible to stand them on their heads to be *im*polite: to pick fights, give insult, or project a nasty or disagreeable air. Such techniques will be part of a set of wider linguistic vehicles for displaying feeling.

Along more sober lines, Judith Irvine (1982) offers an exemplary catalogue of the sorts of expressive devices one can expect to find in language (and that she *does* find in Wolof). She also discusses in some detail the contrastive virtues of different signaling devices, again making explicit the plurifunctionality of language that allows affective and referential modes both to 'pattern differently' and to 'intersect.' Irvine's list includes familiar lexical devices, oaths and imprecations, exclamations, as well as particles, emphatic morphology, and phonological and prosodic processes; she also extends the net to include both sequencing and interactional mechanisms (pauses, repetitions, indirection—as when one hires a griot to send one's affective message) and such nonverbal means as gestures, grimaces, and other facial expressions, and even bodily stance.

Rather than pursue this forbiddingly ample domain, I want to concentrate on the overlap between grammatical categories of evidence—particularly as exemplified by evidential particles in Tzotzil—and the sorts of affective expression that surface in conversational interaction, particularly of a contentious sort.

Playing with evidence

Jakobson (1957) following Whorf (1956), isolates a set of grammatical categories that have to do with what Whorf called assertion, status, and modality—'basic realms of validity' and their subsequent modifications and amplifications.[20] Jakobson classifies as 'evidentials' those categories of truth and validity that shift with the participants of the speech act,[21] and as 'status' those categories that characterize the 'logical quality' of the narrated event without reference to the participants or the speech event.

Evidential categories surface in a variety of syntactic and morphological guises. In Japanese the difference between 'reportive' and 'non-reportive' descriptions, especially of people's states of mind, encodes an evidential distinction in the morphology of predicates (Kuroda, 1973). A related distinction, also linked to questions of volition, is encoded in Lhasa Tibetan by verbal auxiliaries (DeLancey, 1985; 1986). In Tzotzil, as in many languages (see, for example, Laughren (1981) on Warlpiri), evidence and manipulations of truth are the clear province particles.[22]

Whatever their grammaticalization, the correct use and interpretation of these evidentials takes one far beyond clausal syntax into the intricacies of interaction. Evidential categories allow (in fact, often require) speakers to exercise delicate care about getting their facts straight. Even when languages lack explicit obligatory evidential categories, other devices may do similar things. There are culturally contrived situations (such as April Fool's Day), and even gestural conventions (keeping one's fingers crossed, for example, in my own childhood tradition) that suspend normal rules about truth-telling and sincerity.[23]

Moreover, as I will show, evidentials may serve as affective and interactional devices that have little to do with a literal characterization of the 'realm of validity' or narrated events. I will look at four Tzotzil examples here.[24]

LA 'they say'

The particle *la* accompanies declarative sentences to mark them as hearsay: propositions not directly attested by the speaker. Laughlin (1975: 201) writes that *la* is a '[p]article used primarily in narrative speech—e.g., gossip, folk tales, dreams—indicating object or action not directly perceived, or information for whose veracity the speaker assumes no responsibility.' Laughlin goes on to offer the suggested gloss: 'they say.' While declarative sentences with *la* are particularly appropriate to recounting myths, the particle is also central to conversational contexts.

Nor is its use confined to declaratives. The indexicality of the particle is all the more obvious when it appears in an interrogative sentence like the following:

(2) (Chichon 4)
Mi li'oxuk ox **la** k'alal iyal tane?
Were you here when the ashes fell **la**?

The 'evidential' reading suggested by *la* here must be understood to fall on the illocutionary force of the utterance, rather than on its propositional content.[25] That is, the particle allows a speaker to ask the question and at the same time to announce that it is not his question. The modified question looks outside itself, then, and means:

Were you here when the ashes fell? (X [that is, someone other than the speaker] wants to know; or X asked me to ask you.)

The same use of *la*, to grammaticalize a third party not only into the referential content but also into the speech situation of an utterance, occurs in the following wh-question:

(3) (Copoya 283)
K'u **la** yepal   s-k'an   li   skambyo ch-av-ale?
what **la** amount 3E-want ART   change   ICP-2E-say
How much change does she (say she) want(s), did you say?

A Zinacanteco market vendor has just handed over a package of flowers to a Spanish-speaking customer, as his bilingual assistant translates her request for change. His utterance records (i) the question itself ('How much change does she want?'), (ii) the fact that his assistant, the addressee, has already calculated and announced the correct change (encoded in *ch-av-ale* 'you say'), and (iii) the fact that the customer herself has asked for her change (encoded in the particle *la*).

Laughlin's suggested gloss for *la*, 'they say,' combines with familiar principles of (quantity) implicature,[26] to give the particle a characteristic and subtle use in verbal fights, where it often seems to convey a notion like: 'this is not *my* own evidence—*I* am not sure (but someone *else* apparently is).' The indirection of this attribution of responsibility to someone else (often a pointedly specific someone else) can be precisely the desired effect in picking a fight or laying blame, either seriously or humorously. Here are some examples.

When trying to poke fun at one of his farming partners, a man begins to tease the other's son about his marriage plans and prospects.[27] His ploy is to portray the partner in the somewhat ridiculous position of begging him for a wife for his son. He remarks

(4)   (Mario)

Ta	**la**	s-k'an	ali	ta	j-nop-be	y-alib	al-a-tote
ICP	**la**	3E-want	uh	ICP	1E-think-BEN	3E-daughter-in-law	ART-2E-father

Your father (they say) wants me to think of a daughter-in-law for him.

This strategically placed *la* picks out the boy's father as having either to accept the speaker's claim, or to deny that he has expressed such a desire, even though the speaker has not directly attributed it to him. It is, in any case, an indirect and yet compromising invitation to the father to enter the rhetorical fray.

Because it can be hastily imported to shift responsibility, the indirect evidential *la* can also help get someone under fire out of the fire. In the following exchange, R, a corn farmer, is trying to find his fertilizer bucket, which he suspects is being used by the workers of another farmer (who is not present, although his hired workers are). He finds an unused bucket and asks about it. One of the workers, AL, suggests (at line 86) that it will be needed by another putative worker (and A, his coworker, backs him up, against R's scepticism).

(5)   (Kuveta)

```
82   r:    ali li'e che'e much'utik yu'un =
            Uh, and this one, whose is it?
83   a:    mu jna'
            I don't know.
            = [
84   al:   a yu'un li Romin le'e a'a
            Oh, that one belongs to Domingo.
85   r:    pero yu'van chlaj yu'un (??) k'u ma itun?
            But will he be able to finish, what does he need it for?
                         [
86   al:                 ja' la xtal stojbala:l
                         His worker is coming, they say.
                                     [
87   r:                              je'
                                     Hmph.
88   a:    xtal stojbalal a'a
            Yeah, his worker is coming.
                    [
89   al:            yu'un la xtal jun stojbalal
                    Another worker is supposed to be coming for him.
90   a:    yu'nan muk' xich' tal skuveta li stojbalal
            And perhaps his worker isn't bringing a bucket with him.
```

At both lines 86 and 89, AL holds his own against R by using *la* simultaneously to disclaim responsibility for, and to allege, the pro-

position that another worker is expected, who will need the disputed bucket for carrying fertilizer. He thereby doubly protects himself: if R insists on using the bucket, AL has made himself immune to criticism should the rightful user appear; but if no new worker appears, AL can disclaim his remark at 86 as mere hearsay (presumably traceable to his absent employer). R ultimately leaves the bucket alone, although he is clearly unconvinced by the phantom worker (as his 'hmph' at line 87 suggests).

Notably, this evidential indirection can even have an effect in a pragmatically reduced situation like the following. A Zinacanteco ritual kinsman of mine once sent me a tape recording in which he recited a litany of his trials and tribulations over several years during which we had not seen one another. Much of his trouble had to do with a younger brother who had engaged in serious mischief against him, including, everyone agreed, attempts to witch him by supernatural means. In his passionate monologue he describes some of his brother's evildoing, almost exclusively without the hedging of a *la*. At the same time, he rarely refers to his brother at all, virtually never by name, and usually by unmarked pronouns or by means of such euphemisms as *jtatatik ta jech* 'the old gentleman across the way.' He has no hesitation about asserting that his brother has tried to witch him:

(6)   (Monol)

'ora lavi 'une . tzmala ... chicham, tzmala chilaj
so now he is waiting and waiting for me to die
istuch' ti kantelaetike, chonvan ta balamil,
he has cut candles, sold (me) to the Earth Lord
xchi'uk ti yaj'ilol 'une
with his shaman
skotol k'u spas
and done all kinds of things like that
'ak'o chamikon **la**, lajikon **la**
let me die (he says), let me be finished (he says)
pero bweno tzk'an ti kajvaltike, muk' licham 'un
but thanks to Our Lord I haven't died.

In the next to last line, he performs a curious inversion of person with a SUBJ(unctive) form: *ak'-o cham-ik-on* 'cause-SUBJ die-SUBJ-1A' or 'let it happen that I should die' with the evidential *la* attached. Clearly the person to whom this third person imperative is attributed is the evil brother, but no overt or fully attributed quotative device is as consistent with the indirect non-referring tone of the discourse as the 'hearsay' particle. '"I am to die"—this has been said'—but never mentioning overtly the wicked gentleman across the way.

NAN 'perhaps'

Another evidential particle is *nan*, glossed by Laughlin (1975) as 'perhaps.' An alternative gloss might be: 'I am not sure (although I am tentatively suggesting).' As we all know, expressing doubt need not simply be a matter of propositional uncertainty, but can instead be a device for conveying interactional (perhaps even moral) effect, an element in a conversational stratagem. In Tzotzil, *nan* conveys hesitant suggestion.[28]

We have already met *nan* at line 90 of the bucket-search fragment above, where the second worker, chiming in to support his fellow, hazards the suggestion that the putative new worker *just might* show up without a bucket of his own:

(7) (kuveta)
    90 a: yu'**nan** muk' xich' tal skuveta li stojbalal
                 and **perhaps** his worker isn't bringing a bucket with him.

In the context of this miniature struggle between the corn farmer and the two paid laborers, A innocently tosses a 'what if' supposition into the universe of discourse: 'I'm not saying that he *won't* have his own bucket (and, indeed, I'm not even saying for sure that he'll come), but let's suppose that perhaps the new worker shows up without a bucket ...?' (With the unstated challenge: 'and you have run off with this extra one—what then?')

Compare this interactively significant use of *nan* with a standard narrative use of the particle. In the following story, a Zinacanteco is telling about the trials and suffering of his hamlet-mates during the terrible and frightening afternoon that the Chichonal volcano erupted, covering the Chiapas highlands with thick ash. Everyone, terrified, tried to return to his own house to prepare for death. In the case of one man, the storyteller knows only that his character reached home, but not how. At line 21 he speculates, enmbellishing his story with the aid of *nan*.

(8) (Chichon)
    210 oy jun j-tek-lum pwes
            One fellow from Jteklum (the Ceremonial Center of Zinacantán)
    211 ta y-ok xa **nan** i-k'ot k'u nan xi xa i-bat
            I think **perhaps** he went the rest of the way on foot, or something like that.
    212 pwes ja' xa i-k'ot y-al un
            Anyway, he got there and he told them

Just as *nan* can provide a storyteller with a device for introducing unattested speculation into a narrative, the particle can also furnish an interactive device for extracting an audience's *reaction* to some bit of speculation:

(9) (Mayo)
    50   x: te **nan** k'alal mi jk'elan komel ja' no'ox bu ta=
               Never mind if **perhaps** I just have to give away (my goods)
    51   =jtojbe
               so long as I meet my costs
    52   lajlaj **nan** jtojbe
               just let me **perhaps** manage to pay my costs
    53   x2: altik no'ox
               not a chance at all (that that will happen)!
    54   ali mayo li' che'e
               This is May (and hence there will be much demand for what you're you're selling).

Here a nervous flower-seller is packing up his bundles to head off to market the next day. He has never sold flowers at this time of year before, and he is pessimistically worrying that he will be lucky just to recoup his costs, let alone make a profit on the deal. His dubious *nan*s seem to fish for reassurance, which is ultimately forthcoming from his older brother at line 53.

The apparent evidential suggestion of *nan* can also figure in battles both for the floor and for the right to tell a story, in a gossip session. In the following fragment, when several gossipers are trying to introduce a new bit of dirt, there is a miniature struggle underway between CA and R, both of whom want to tell the good parts of the story. R has started to say that the dirty old lady they are talking about used to engage in further illicit sex. Through considerable overlap and interruption, CA manages to inject a caveat, hedged with *nan*, that suggests R has mislaunched the story.

(10) (proylan)
    322 ca: mi spas proval li mas krem yan li jch'iltik
               Has she tried out any other boys among our countrymen?
                                             [
    323 r: an ja' mu jna'
                                           Why I'm not sure
    324 an o la is-
            why, she has I hear done=
    325 ca: pero ja' **nan** taj yak'ele
            but that was **perhaps** when being taken home
                    [
    326 r: chich' intyeksyon k'alal
            She got injections when ...

327   li yak'el k'alal x-
         when being brought home from
328   ch'ilolaj a'a
         from curing ceremonies, yes.
         [
329   ca: ja' ka'yoj a'a
         Yes, I've heard about that
330   k'alal tzsut tal ta sna li jchamel ya'el
         when she returned home from her patient's house
331   chbat ti ilole
         when she went curing.

The doubt of *nan* at line 325 seems feigned; it slyly suggests, without overt insurrection, that CA knows more about the details of the story than R, and thus has the right to carry it forward, as he subsequently does.

A'A 'indeed'

Tzotzil makes frequent use of two further evidential particles, both of which also play important sequential roles in conversation. Both orient the propositional content of an utterance to the preceding utterances, commenting in one way or another on a presumed body of *shared* information. Since the extent of such shared knowledge can vary between speakers, it is not surprising that it can also be topic for contention, to be exploited for competitive interactional designs. The two particles are *yu'van* and *a'a*, both of which are usually translated 'indeed.' Neither particle can be easily be attached to a sentence in isolation, however, because both imply an evidential commentary on some *preceding utterance by another speaker*, but in relation to the current utterance.[29]

Laughlin (1975: 37) lists *a'a* as an exclamation meaning 'indeed!, surely!, certainly!, of course!' As I mentioned, *a'a* is logically tied to what students of conversational analysis call 'seconds'—turns that follow and are in some sense shaped by preceding utterances.[30] A slightly fuller paraphrase for *a'a* might be 'I agree, and what I am saying is consistent with what has just been said' or 'I agree with that, and I already knew it, too' or, even more contentiously, 'I can tell you you're right.' Students of argument often tell us that fights start with disagreement;[31] we may find it illuminating, by contrast, to examine the structure of *agreement*.[32]

Two features of my tentative gloss for *a'a* hint at its interactional utility: the suggestion that the person using *a'a* already knew the facts with which he is agreeing seems to lend to the particle a certain subversive power in the conversational struggle over information, truth, and knowledge. And

the facts that using *a'a* posits a logical link between one utterance and another, and that it implies a look backwards to the relevance of what has already been said, make it a useful device for setting up implicatures and manipulating sequence.

For a canonical use of *a'a* we can return to the problem of the fertilizer buckets. R has asked about another bucket:

(11)   (kuveta)
   40   a: mol kuveta =
              It was an old bucket
   41   al: = mol yu'van =
                         it sure was old
   42   r: = a? ja' li avak' o volje? =
              oh? That was the one you used yesterday?
   43   a: ja' kak' o volje a'a
                                        yeah, the one I used yesterday
                                     = [
   44   al: ja' li iyak' o volje
                                        he used it yesterday
   45   a: mol kuveta
              an old bucket
   46   r: aa, mi mu'nuk ja' te batem yu'un li Kristoe?
              oh, isn't it the one that Chris has with him?
   47   a: ee, yu'un ja' yu'van =
              eh, that's the one, of course!

The relevant exchange here is at lines 41 and 42: R ventures a guess that the bucket in question was the one A used the day before for putting fertilizer on the cornfield; A agrees: 'that's the one I used *a'a*' or '*you're right*, that's *indeed* the one I used.' Here A agrees with the previous proposition, and the particle *a'a* signals the connection between the two turns. (There are similar cases of repetitive agreement, with *a'a*, at line kuveta: 88 in example (5), and proylan: 328 in example (10) above.)

The fact that *a'a* must agree with something that has gone before elucidates the complicated notion of what *happens* in conversation, or what is available (one wants to say 'in the universe of discourse') for an utterance to agree *with*. Among other things, it suggests, unsurprisingly, that a conversational turn may include action or inference that is never put into words. It may often happen, that is, that conversation constructs, and these particles in particular implicate, unstated 'hypothetical' domains[33] that interlocutors must respond to. For example, *a'a* can appear in a second turn which agrees not with a previous utterance but with its unstated implicature. One clear example comes in the pessimistic flower-seller's worries:

(12) (mayo)
```
 38  j:   batuk jchep onox lavi naxe
          If only a load had gone (to market) earlier today
                     [  ]
 39  x2:             xch'amik ka'uktik a'a loj ryox li naxe
                     They would have bought it indeed, for sure, earlier.
```

One of the bystanders expresses the hypothetical thought that rather than waiting until the next day, the flower-seller might well have taken a load of flowers to market earlier that very day. Another interlocutor, X2, picks up and agrees with the clear (but unstated) suggestion here that such an early load would surely have been snapped up by the buyers, marking his agreement with that implicature by *a'a*.

Conversationalists can also agree with an *image*, suggested or portrayed by previous talk. In the following exchange, two drunken Zinacantecos, P and M, are trying to cheer up one of their fellows. R, a powerful political figure who feels he has been slighted in a recent dispute. They are imagining a scene in which elders might criticize R for offering advice in a context where his experience might seem inadequate.

(13) (tunem)
```
 90  m:   le'e mu xa xu' xa x'albat
      ·   That one (i.e. R) can't be criticized.
                     [
 91  p:              mu xu' xa xal yech
                     They can't scold him thus
 92  m:   mu xa x'albat
          He can't be criticized
                     [
 93  p:              k'u cha'al =
                     'how
 94       avil k'u cha'al achan yech ti k'u xaval =
          have you seen, how have you learned to speak this way?'
          =[                          ]
 95  m:   ta yech ta mu yechuk
          'speaking without reason'
 96       =k'u yu'un chatik' ave mu x'utate mo'oj
          'why do you butt in?'—he won't be scolded thus, no
                     [
 97  p:              k'u ma cha'al =
                     'How is it you
 98       =chaval yech mi'n achanoj yech bu aviloj
          speak thus? Have you learned, have you seen?'
                     [
 99  m:              aa, mo'oj
                     Ah, no
```

```
100  p:   muk' bu xa kiloj un kere:
          'I haven't seen it (that you learned), boy!'
                     [
101  m:   mu me x'ale yech a'a
          He won't indeed be scolded that way!
```

Jointly P and M imagine the sort of thing that elders would not be able to say to R. For example, elders might criticize him for claiming expertise and wisdom in ritual arenas where he had no previous experience; but, P points out, this would be inappropriate criticism. At line 101, M agrees, using the particle *a'a* that harks back to previous talk at lines 90–92, that the hypothetical scenario could not happen. (Both P and M are trying to mollify R by giving him an exaggerated compliment: he feels that his supporters did not speak up for him in a political dispute, but they are arguing that he is too eminent to need such outside support.)

Apparently *a'a* can also agree not only with an ordinary implicature, but also with what seems to follow from or be presupposed by previous action. In the following exchange, several corn farmers are planning their day's activities. P has said that he will finish fertilizing one section of his own cornfield, and then he will work on a section of fields belonging to his son Antun. He says that only a little bit is left to do. The talk continues as follows:

(14) (antpox)
```
      r:   ali Antune, xlok' o li spox a'a
           As for Antun, there will indeed be enough
           (fertilizer to finish the job) I suppose.
      p:   xlok' ono nan a'a yu'van
           Indeed there will be enough, of course.
```

Here R says: 'Antun will have enough fertilizer *a'a*' or 'I am supposing (from what you have implied before) that he does.' P has not said that Antun has enough fertilizer, only that he intends to finish fertilizing Antun's fields.

In this case, agreeing with a previously unstated presupposition seems to suggest, contradictorily, doubt: 'I presume you have made sure that Antun has enough fertilizer (because if not ...)' Here is part of the complexity of agreement: it is possible to express a *reservation* by agreeing with only **part** of, or something conditional on, an utterance. In fact, *a'a* can clothe an oppositional move in the garb of the agreement. This is what seems to be happening in the otherwise puzzling use of *a'a*, in example (5) above, where R finds an unused fertilizer bucket which he suspects may be his missing property, but which AL claims as that of his missing employer:

(15)   (Kuveta)
   82   r: ali li'e che'e much'utik yu'un =
           Uh, and this one, whose is it?
   83   a: mu jna'
           I don't know.
           =[
   84   al: a yu'un li Romin le'e **a'a**
           Oh, that one **indeed** belongs to Domingo.

AL's *a'a* in line 84 seems to depend on an unstated implication (perhaps deriving from the fact that, during the continuing search for the missing bucket, AL and A have not volunteered this unoccupied bucket as a candidate for the lost one) that it must, indeed, belong to someone else, i.e., *not* be the one R is looking for. AL's remark at 84 seems to interpret R, at 82, to be saying 'And whose bucket is this one, then, (I presume not mine)?'—something with which AL can agree.

The particle also lends itself to sequential manipulations. When talk follows various currents at the same time, it may be necessary for a speaker to design a single utterance so as both to make his own point and to (seem to) react to another's prior or current turn simultaneously, thus changing horse in conversational midstream. The technique seems to be common in struggles for the conversational floor. In the following sequence, the speaker is actually agreeing with his *own* prior utterance, but he constructs his remark with an *a'a* which seems to suggest that he is merely agreeing with the previous speaker (with whom he is actually competing for telling the story). CA is describing a famous adulterer, whom he characterizes as 'young.' R wants it to be clear that the person in question was young *then* (but is no longer), but he uses *a'a* to phrase his correction as agreement.

(16)   (proylan)
   46   ca: pero yu'un krem
           but he was young
   46   krem tajmek li: =
           he was very young
   48   r: = to'ox
                  back then
   49   ca: li- ali:
           the uh ...
   50   r: pero vo'ne xa **a'a** u:n
           but that was **indeed** long ago
                [
   51   ca: krem ya'ele =
                he was young, it seems
   52   cn: = a bweno
                     a good

YU'VAN 'It's obvious, despite what has been said'

The particle *yu'van*,[34] in utterance final position, suggests 'of course, indeed, what I am now saying is true, despite what you might think (and probably you should have known it, despite the fact that you appear to have forgotten it or to be ignoring it, perhaps deliberately).' In some contexts the particle seems to have the force of 'after all,' as in 'despite everything, it turns out after all that ... .'

The typical use of utterance final *yu'van* is to mark a proposition as obvious in the face of a remark that seems to contradict it. Here several Zinacentecos are gossiping about a famous incident in which some schoolchildren shot the lover of a famous witch with a slingshot. The question at hand is: did she ever find out who did the deed? And if so, did the culprit survive, or did she manage to do him in with further witchcraft? CN begins by asking whether the mischievous schoolchild is still alive.

(17)   (proylan)
   263   cn: kuxul to nan li j'a'yele mi ichone van ta balamil
            the fellow is still alive perhaps, or was he maybe witched?
                  [
   264   ca: kuxul nan
                 he is alive perhaps
                 [
   265   r: i'i
                 No

R counters by saying that the old woman couldn't have witched the boy because she didn't know his identity.

   266   mi'n tzna' un
           How could she know (who it was)?
   267   mu'nuk bu chil much'u
           she never saw who it was.
           [
   268   cn: mu nan bu vinaj ono'ox
           perhaps it never came out after all.
   269   r: te tz'akal to ilo'ilajik li chanvun une
           the school children talked about it later
           [
   270   cn: an pero te (ivinaj) ta tz'akal un **yu'van**
           but, it must have come out later **after all**
   271   k' ti ivinaj to tzlo'iltaik to ika'i taj e
           since I heard the gossip about it.

At line 270 CN argues that the identity of the slingshot-shooting

miscreant *must* have become public knowledge, despite what the others are saying, since even he, a man from another hamlet, had heard the gossip. He uses a *yu'van* 'of course!' to emphasize this oppositional move.

We have also seen *yu'van* in action in the cornfields. In example (14) above, repeated here, when R has implied doubt about whether there will be enough fertilizer to cover Antun's field, P retorts with the particle:

(18)   (Antpox)
    r: ali Antune, xlok' o li spox a'a
         As for Antun, there will indeed be enough (fertilizer to finish the
           job) I suppose.
    p: xlok' ono nan a'a **yu'van**
         Indeed there will be enough, **of course**.

In fact, the use of the contrastive *yu'van* here provides good evidence that P has interpreted R's remark, despite the apparently a greeing *a'a*, as impying that perhaps P has not verified that Antun has enough fertilizer to finish the job. Indeed, both *a'a* and *yu'van* often combine in utterances this way, suggesting augmented and perhaps oppositional agreement: I agree with what you say, but there is more to be said (which you don't seem to appreciate).

As in the case of *a'a, yu'van* can be directed not simply at the content of a prior utterance but also at is implicatures or presuppositions. In the following conversational fragment a Zinacanteco (B) is telling his brother (X) and his mother (M) about a disgusting meal which he and some companions were given by some abominable foreigners. Despite their misgivings, they ate the meat, which later caused one of their number to throw up violently. The question is: did the offending substance give any hint of being inedible before it was eaten, or only after it was in their bellies? The brother, X, begins the fragment by observing that it only began to have bad effects once it had been ingested.

(19)   (prans)
   144   x: yo'on xa 'abtej talel
           it started to work on his heart
                [   ]
   145   b: ji (k'ajomal ...)
                  yeah, it only—
                       [   ]
   146   m: yale iyal =
                     it went down fine
   147   x: = jii =
                         yeah
   148   b: = ch'abal i yik' a'a ch'abal a'a **yu'van**
             right, it had no bad smell, **of course** it had no bad smell

By combining *a'a* and *yu'van*, the storyteller, B, agrees with the implications of previous remarks, but goes on to certify as **obvious** X's suggestion that the bad meat only began to make the hapless Indian sick **after** he had eaten it. There is a chain of implicature here: 'if the meat had had a putrid smell, do you foolishly suppose the fellow would have eaten it at all?'

Notice that in utterance *initial* position, *yu'van* has an obviously related but almost reversed meaning. An initial *yu'van* often combines with an ironic final *a-na'-oj* '2Ergative-know-PERF, you know, you are in possession of the knowledge that,' to form a sentence that will be heard as a sarcastic rhetorical question. Laughlin (1975: 71) seems to have this usage of *yu'van* in mind when he glosses the particle as 'do you think? How could ...?' Thus, for example, the following, sentence which we shall meet again below,

(20)   (antun)

yu'van	ch'abal	krixchano	chk'elvan	**ana'oj**
indeed	not exist	person	watch	**you know**

uses the two evidential words to bracket the inner sentence *ch'abal krixchano chk'elvan* 'there are no people to look (at you).' The utterance so produced thus means something like 'you don't suppose (wrongly) that there are no people to look (at you), do you?'—a kind of mocking criticism of a (real or imagined) interlocutor's obviously foolish position that one can ever get away with doing something in Zinacantán without being spied upon.

Disagreement and non-agreement

Much of the literature on arguments concentrates on the nature of contention as *disagreement* (see M. Goodwin, 1980; Goodwin and Goodwin, i.p.; Vuchinich, 1984; Lein and Brenneis, 1983; Brenneis and Lein, 1977; Schiffrin, 1984).[35] Whereas disagreement is often couched in terms of overt opposition or denial (Yes you did! No, I did NOT! Yes you did; Blanche: Now don't deny it! John: I'm NOT denying it!), there is often an equally strong feeling in argument that protagonists are talking *past* one another: disagreement, as it were, without denial.

'And how exactly like an egg he is!' she said aloud, standing with her hands ready to catch him, for she was every moment expecting him to fall.

'It's *very* provoking,' Humpty Dumpty said after a long silence, looking away from Alice as he spoke, 'to be called an egg— *very*!'

'I said you *looked* like an egg, Sir,' Alice gently explained. 'And some eggs are

very pretty, you know,' she added, hoping to turn her remark into some sort of compliment.

'Some people,' said Humpty Dumpty, looking away from her as usual, 'have no more sense than a baby!'

Alice didn't know what to say to this: it wasn't at all like conversation, she thought, as he never said anything to *her*; in fact, his last remark was evidently addressed to a tree ... .

When people disagree, they can manipulate sequence (not answering when they are addressed, interrupting, and so on), relevance (offering non sequiturs), and both truth and canons of truth (lying and distorting), to produce the desired sort of contentiousness. The same mechanisms which signal conversational cooperativeness, on Grice's (1975) familiar principles, can be put to work to signal uncooperativeness. In the final sections of this paper, I will look at a Tzotzil conversation in which the evidential devices I have been discussing are put to work for mildly combative ends. I will end with some comparative observations.

When did you stop beating your wife?

The following fragments come from a sequence of talk, recorded in the village of Nabenchauk, in the municipality of Zinacantán in Chiapas, Mexico. This particular episode arose when a young man went out drinking at a cantina, got drunk, and had to be shamelessly hauled home by an obliging drinking partner from Chamula, a neighboring municipality. Sometime thereafter, he beat up his wife, accusing her of disobedience and disrespect. She ran home to her relatives, and was only induced to return by the promise of a mediated settlement.

Two village elders, Petul and Lol, have been summoned to help settle the dispute. The young man has a reputation for drunkenness, and this is not the first time he has beaten his wife. The two elders are giving advice and counsel to the man, Antun, who is lying in bed with a miserable hangover and who takes no part in the talk recounted here, and to his aggrieved wife, Loxa. There is little question of Antun's guilt, here, and he is really too sick even to try to defend himself against the elders' criticism. However, the talk is still contentious: although the elders want Antun to mend his ways, they are also interested in preserving the marriage, and therefore they aim some of their critisicm indirectly at the wife, intimating that she too may have been insufficiently obedient or compliant. Not surprisingly, she defends herself, although often obliquely, and she rarely misses a chance to heap further abuse on her drunken husband's fogged head. Moreover, there is a certain current of self-defense in Lol's talk, as well, since he himself has

been known in the past for his drunkenness. The ironic tension thus produced often has the superficial form of disagreement.

The entire reconciliation is too long to reproduce here, but I will sketch the main lines of argument in the sections we shall be concerned with.

The elders first propose to Loxa that she should be more obedient: that when her husband wants to drink, she should encourage him to stay home to do it, by going out to get beer and spirits when he suggests that he wants them. Loxa retorts that she would be perfectly willing to buy alcohol, but that she cannot comply with such a request if she has been given no money to pay for the drinks. The elders are forced to agree that a sensible man can only send out for booze if he can pay for it. If he is *truly* sensible, he will stay at home to drink it. Thereafter, if he gets drunk, he will simply go to bed at home, without raising a ruckus. This, in turn, is more likely to happen if people in the house do not provoke him when he is in a drunken state.

Discussion then turns to the self-inflicted miseries of the subsequent hangover, but also to the corresponding touchy state of a man who is either drunk or suffering the ill-effects of drunkenness. Do not, they warn, talk back to such a man because of course he will then beat you. They offer exemplary tales of other drunkards' wives who restrain their tongues until after a man has sobered up, in the face of Loxa's protestations.

Finally, in the last fragment that will concern us, all participants discuss the shame and embarrassment that Antun should feel for having to be carried home by a Chamula, exposing himself to the ridicule of his neighbors—a severe social fault in this community obsessed by secrecy and gossip.[36]

In elaborating these various arguments, the speakers sometimes cooperate and sometimes oppose one another. Let's examine some of the talk, and see how the different speakers' interests are served in the unfolding discussion. Part of the process of dispute settlement in Zinacantán requires that the participants evolve a series of shared discursive understandings, along with articulated moral stances about what is being said. And this process, in turn, involves the artful use of evidentials, as both rhetorical and affective tools.

Serves you right

In the following fragment, Lol (shown as L) largely has the floor, and Petul (shown as P) is serving as his interlocutor. The elders are talking about the hypothetical sensible man who simply goes to bed peaceably after he gets drunk. The arrows mark point at which what I am loosely

calling evidentials (shown in **boldface**) signal points of agreement and (mock, simulated, or rhetorical) disagreement.

(21)   (Antun1)

1   I: mu k'usi jmul ya'el chisakube
        I am without blame when I wake up next morning.
2   ch'abal xi
        Nothing (is wrong)
3   p: →**eso**
        right!
4   I: ch'abal un, lek oy un =
        Nothing (is wrong), (everything) is fine.
5   p: = xchamelal mu xu'
                              One is just useless because
                              of the hangover.
6   I: xchamelal mu xu'
        One is just useless because of the hangover.
7   mi chave' xi mantale
        'Will you eat something,' is all they'll say.
8   ch'abal
        No.
9   mu sk'an
        You won't want (to eat).
10   mu sk'an ta jmoj
        You absolutely won't want (to eat) anything.
                    [
11 p: **aj,** mu x-
        Ah, you won't ...
12 I: xenel chak'
        You'll feel like throwing up.
13 p: sa'bil un
        But you asked for it (it's your own fault).
14 I: sa'bil che'e
        Yeah, you asked for it.
15   →k'u **van** mu sa'biluk
        Of course you asked for it!
16 p: hehhh
17 I: →sa'bil **a'a yu'van**
        Indeed, you asked for it (by getting drunk in the first place).
18   mu k'u ciyak'otik ta pwersa
        We aren't forced to accept anything (like booze).
19 p: sa'bil, muk' bu ch'ak'bat ta pwersa
        It serve you right, nothing was forced (on you).
                              [
20 I: ja' yech le'e
                              It's that way with him, too
                              [the drunken kid in question].

Lol argues that a man who drinks should simply put himself to bed without causing a disturbance. By the next day, when he wakes up, he will not have gotten himself into any trouble (line 1). At line 3, Petul gives confirming back-channel[37] agreement (with the Spanish word *eso*); but at line 5 his commentary is more substantive: in the guise of agreeing that the day after getting drunk the well-behaved man will find himself free of trouble, he suggests that the only thing wrong will be the *xchamelal*—literally, 'it's sickness,' that is, the resulting hangover. Lol retains main control of the floor, first echoing (line 6) and subsequently developing (lines 7–12) the theme of post-drunk queasiness, in an imagined scenario in which the hungover culprit refuses the food his wife proffers.

At line 13, Petul introduces another theme, by suggesting, in a minimal responsive turn, that of course one's post-binge hangover is well deserved: *sa'bil*—literally 'sought after'. It serves you right if you feel lousy after drinking too much, Lol goes on to agree, arguing that the ill-effects of drinking are your own fault, because nobody *forced* you to do it.[38] Here the evidentials *van* (the interrogative form of *nan*), at line 15, and later *a'a* and *yu'van*, at line 17, play a clear rhetorical role: they suggest that the 'serves you right' moral is not only obvious but that it would be ridiculous to argue to the contrary (although no one, except perhaps the guilty Antun himself, implicitly through his actions, *has* argued to the contrary).

At the end of the fragment, at line 19, Petul again gives echoing, repetitive agreement, which is overlapped when Lol starts off on a new line of argument. Here we see the collaborative production of a conversational theme, in which both the principal speaker and his designated interlocutor shape their talk towards a cooperative moral, using the particles of agreement and disagreement to cast their conclusions in the appropriate evidential tone: their line of reasoning, says the tone, is obvious. Consequently the opposite course of action, taken by the abashed and hung-over husband, must be understood as outright foolishness.[39]

Talking back

Although officially the two dispute-settlers are chewing out the drunken husband, they are also trying to bring about a balanced reconciliation. Their moral is from time to time pointedly directed at Loxa, the wife. Her reaction at various points clearly shows she knows this to be the case. The talk continues with Lol admonishing Loxa (shown as Lo) about how she ought to react to her husband when he comes home drunk. Precisely at the point that Lol recommends that Loxa not talk back to her drunken husband, she begins to talk back to *him*.

(22). (Antun1)
22	l:	mu ya'uk xasokbe sjol mi chyakube
		Try to avoid provoking him when he is drunk.
23		tuk' xavalbe mi chve'
		Just ask him properly if he wants to eat.
24l		mi ta .. xuch' panin k'usuk
		or if he wants to drink some corn gruel or something.
25		pwes, mu ya'uk xatak'be
		But don't presume to talk back to him.
26		mu ya'uk xa k'usi avalbe
		Just don't say anything to him.
27		le' uk une k'alal chyakube este-
		That one, too, when he gets drunk...
		[
28	lo:	pero k'u yu'un **ana'oj** (ta) jtak'be yu'un
		(oy k'u yech ...)
		But why **do you suppose** I talk back to him? ...
29	··	ak'o min batz'i ta jtak'ulanbe
		And even if I DID keep talking back..
30		mu'nuk bu chka'i ya'el li vo'one
		It isn't as though I'd know myself (what to say)
		[
31	l:	yu'un ali:
		because uh ...
32	lo:	mu jna' mi
		I don't know if ...
33		mu xa xka'i jba k'u ta xkal un
		I can't even think of anything I would say to him.

The second person verbs starting at line 22 tell Loxa: 'you mustn't provoke him when he is drunk, just speak to him normally and politely, offering him food and drink.' Loxa breaks in, at line 28, defending herself: she *doesn't* talk back, and she wouldn't know what to say to him even if she did. Loxa protests Lol's line of argument with an evidential device, the ironic use of *ana'oj 'do* you suppose?, which, as I have mentioned, often occurs with the particle *yu'van.*[40] Here saying 'do you think?' implies 'of course not': that is, it is precisely the sort of device appropriate to contentious backtalk, as it suggests, angrily, 'what you are saying is false and implies mistaken thinking on your part.'

Lol, with Petul's rhetorical support, beats back Loxa's miniature insurrection here, to regain both verbal and moral control of the floor. At line 38, Loxa is brought back into repetitive agreement.

(22) (Antun1)
34	l:	ali k'al chyakube, porke
		When he gets drunk, why is that?

35		porke mu sk'an tak'bel
		Because he doesn't want any back talk.
36	p:	jyakubel mu sk'an tak'bel
		A drunkard doesn't want back talk.
		[
37	l:	yu'un chopol sjol
		Because he is out of his head.
		[ ]
38	lo:	mu sk'an tak'bel yu'un chopol sjol
		He doesn't want back talk because he is out of his head.

Petul has resumed his role as standard interlocutor, repeating Lol's words and hence reaffirming his sentiments starting at line 36. Ultimately, Loxa also aligns herself with this line of argument, repeating the phrase *mu sk'an tak'bel* 'he won't stand for being talked back to', and probably agreeing with heartfelt vehemence that *chopol sjol* (literally, '[her husband] has a bad head').

Shame

The attribution of fault, an underlying topic in the earlier parts of this conversation and one that produced certain tensions between Loxa and the elders, later gives way to a discussion of the shamefulness of Antun's behavior on this particular drunken binge. This is a topic which serves perfectly as a vehicle for affectively loaded mutual agreement among the participants. Evidential devices, of the kind we have already met, reappear in this sequence to produce the requisite sort of apparent concord with a constant undercurrent of contention.

The facts seem to be these: Antun, down in the center of the village, got drunk with a group of friends. Collapsing in a stupor, he was only brought home thanks to the efforts of a Chamula cornworker, who carried him bodily from the cantina to his doorstep. It was apparently after this that Antun beat Loxa, when she refused to send out for more liquor.

Capitalizing on an image provided by Lol and Petul (of shamefulness of drunken misbehavior that drove many men, including Lol himself, to forswear booze), Loxa proceeds to embellish the theme as a way of heaping more abuse on Antun. Too much abuse does not serve the elders' ends—they are after recognition of the couple rather than a ratified total breakdown—but they are hard pressed to disarm Loxa's rhetoric.

(23)   (Antun1)
       136   lo: manchuk xa li totil ulo' jna'tik
                   if it hadn't been for the old Chamula, who knows?
                                                        [
       137   p: hehh
                                                        [
       138   l: hehh
       140   l: ti manchuk li' li kulo' mole muk' bu x'eanvan
                   if it hadn't been for the Chamula, no one could
                       have carried him
                                        [
       141   p: kere, manchuk li'
                                        damn, lucky for him!
       142   bal to
                   just as well ...
                                [
       143   lo: mu sna' yu'un vo:kol yu'un (...)
                   he doesn't know how hard it was
                                         [
       144   p: bal to me stojbe sk'ak'al to
                                         just as well he had paid (the
                                             Chamula's) wages

Loxa starts in by reminding everyone that Antun, in the depths of his shameless drunk, was hauled home by a Chamula. (This is all the more shameful since Chamulas are often considered by Zinacantecos to be somewhat oafish bumpkins, given to excessive drinking themselves.) The incident is common knowledge, but its mention seems to make both elders somewhat uneasy. They both laugh nervously (at lines 137 and 138), and proceed to try to produce a defusing joke.[41] Petul makes joking reference to the fact that the Chamula in question was originally one of Antun's hired cornworkers, although he *hadn't* been paid to haul his employer around. His language, especially the use of the exclamation *kere* 'boy!', carries a humorous tone.

Then Petul switches to the evidential *la* 'they say', to distance himself from the claim that it was indeed a Chamula who had to carry Antun home. Instead of simply agreeing about the shameful incident with the Chamula, which is now labelled as hearsay by the particle *la*, Petul jokes at the Chamula's expense. And Lol, overlapping Loxa's attempt to carry on with her criticism, agrees with Petul's joking image, using *a'a* at line 148.

(24)   (Antun1)
       145   p: ja' la yech
                   it was that way, **they say**
       146   ja' la ulo' i'eanvan tal xi
                   they say it was a Chamula who carried him

       147   lo: pero yu'un mu jna'be
                   but I can't imagine what-
                                        [
       148   l: naka ulo' a'a hehh
                   just Chamulas, **right**, heh heh
       149   p: batz'i toyol un
                   it was very expensive
       150   l: li'—
                   here—
       151   p: ak'o ba sjak'be stojol sk'ak'al povre ulo'
                   let him go find out how much he owes him for his
                       time, the poor Chamula

There are conflicting intended lines of argument clearly displayed here. Loxa, outraged wife, wants the chance to continue to air her husband's disgusting behavior. Petul seems to want to defuse Loxa's outrage and to put a joking end to further mention of this uncomfortably disreputable incident. He suggests a hypothetical scenario (marking it with *nan* 'perhaps') which conjures a humorous image, overlapping Loxa's further revelations (marked, notably, as contrastive with the concessive *pero* 'but'). And Lol searches for an opening to reintroduce his own personal example as an object lesson for all drinking husbands. These three conversational ends continue to struggle with each other as talk progresses.

(25)   (Antun1)
       152   l: i—
       153   ta melel
                   that's true!
       154   k'u cha'al ka'uk une?
                   that's just what I say, indeed
                                        [
       155   p: yu'nan
                                        because **perhaps**
       156   lo: pero stzinet xa'i pero tal to snit' tal
                   but he was tipsy, but still he led him back here
                                        [
       157   p: yu'nan sa'ik tal povre ulo' tal kuchvanuk =
                   they **must have** gone looking for the poor Chamula to do the
                       hauling
       158   = taj jyakubel
                   the drunk
       159   l: kere
                   damn
       160   pero k'u cha'al chkal une
                   but just as I've been saying ...

Finally, in the final fragment, Petul admits that the whole incident with the Chamula was indeed a cause for *k'exlal* 'shame'—the kind of shame or embarrassment that, in Zinacantán, is consequent on a public display of foolish or laughable behavior (Bricker, 1973). Loxa seizes on Petul's words, embellishing her condemnation of her husband's misbehavior with the ironic particle *yu'van*. She does not elicit the agreement or confirmation that her evidential usage seems to invite. Instead the rhetorical ploy serves to allow her to give vent to her anger, which the elders must somehow igore or accept.

(26) (Antun1)

```
161   p:   puta pero li k'exlale oy tajmek un kere
           damn, but there is plenty of shame there!
                          [
162   l:                  mu xa bu——
                          no longer—
163   lo:  k'exlal
··         shame!
           [
164   l:   mu xa k'u—
           I couldn't any longer——
165        mu xa k'u jta
           I couldn't survive any longer (when I was drinking)
                          [
166 · lo:  yu'van ch'abal krixchano chk'elvan ana'oj
           do you think there were no people to watch (the spectacle)?
                          [
167   l:                  k'u cha'al chkale
                          as I say ...
168   lo:  yu'van ch'abal krixchano chk'elvan
           do you think no people watched?
           [
169   l:   yu'un chilom xa onox xika'i taj k'al ikikta xa li=
           because I was falling to the ground when I gave up (drinking)
170        =poxe
           liquor
```

Ultimately the elders divert the issue. Lol successfully returns to his own moral posturing, and the tale of his own alcoholic reform.

Conclusion: truth and anger

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle distinguishes three modes of persuasion by verbal means: 'the first kind depends on the personal character of the

speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself' (1941: 1329). I have argued that in contentious natural conversation the last two modes—playing on emotions, and playing with truth—are often intermingled, and that the same linguistic devices may serve both functions. Contending (or hedging or denying) the truth may be inherently argumentative and hence, by its very nature, *affective*.

Aristotle accords special status, in rhetoric, to anger, 'defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what one concerns oneself. . .' (1941: 1380). Anger is an emotion that can be persuasively wielded: displayed by an orator, inspired and manipulated in his audience.

When Loxa remarks, sarcastically, 'I suppose you think there was no one to see my drunken fool of a husband,' she uses the *yu'van* particle seemingly especially designed for such ironic use.[42] The evidential device is simultaneously, and perhaps characteristically, a vehicle of affective expression.

Whether Blanche and John Bickerton are supposed to be truly angry with each other or not, they are in a battle in which truth is their weapon. They play with it, twist it, hide it, throw it in each other's faces, make it do their self-interested, if hackneyed, bidding. The *tone* is angry, whether or not the underlying feeling is.

(27) (the Bickersons)

```
Blanche: Why didn't you show up for the party, John?=
John:    =I TOLD ya
         I got stuck at the office
Blanche: I'd like to believe that
         What were you doing?
John:    working
Blanche: su:re sure
         That's always the first excuse
```

Perhaps the best evidence that truth, and the evidential categories that assert it, are characteristic vehicles of anger and argument, however, comes from the ubiquitousness of this device of ironic assertion. I will close with some comparative vignettes.

Especially striking, in comparative perspective, is the use of *yes* to mean 'no'. Two squabbling sisters, for example, in their daily late-afternoon fight, resort to sarcasm, again in the form of mock agreement:

(28) (sophmaya)

```
10   s:   C'mon Maya, STOP it.
11   m:   you nearly BROKE the television=
12   s:   =yeah I nearly broke the television ←
```

A Mexico City woman, in a fight with her roommate that will ultimately cause their entire relationship to disintegrate, argues that she has been concerned for the other's recent difficulties. The roommate responds with an angry dismissal, in the guise of dissimulated agreement:

```
(29)  (pilar2)
      42  l:   yo te llamé a España
               I called you in Spain
      43       y pagué por tu llamada
               and I paid for your call
      44       y me preocupé mucho por ti y
               and I was very worried about you
                                           [
      45  p:                               sí sí sí sí sí
                                           yeah yeah yeah
                                              [
      46  l:                                  y si quieres que te =
                                              and if you want me
      47       = lo diga te lo di:go:
               to say so I will tell you so
```

Where anger is not appropriate, evidentials can be manipulated for humorous ends.[43] On the volleyball court, the perpetrator of an outrageous dribble shot couches his mock apology in elaborately exaggerated hyperbole, marking its insincerity with the very trappings of sincerity:

```
(30)  (volley)
      196  b:   ha ha right
      197       Oh NO! ((Gardner's dribble shot))
      198  p:   a ha ha ha
      199       heh heh
      200  g:   God I'm sorry John I really apologize
      201  bb:  you should
                          [
      202  j:             it's alright
```

And the ironic apology (line 200) is, equally ironically, accepted (line 202).

In a similar way, when B sets a poor hit to a hustling BB, who is unable to handle it, B, instead of blaming himself, inverts the moral balance by addressing mock criticism towards BB at line 41. BB, in the same spirit, accepts (at line 42). (B[ob],J[ohn] and BB [also Bob] are teammates.)

```
(31)  (volley)
      36  bb:  up
      37  b:   this is death!
      38  bb:  ah ah ah ((misses))
                     [
      39  b:         ha ha ha
```

```
(31)  (volley)
      40  g:   that's testing him Bob =
      41  j:                           = little more alertness there
                                       Bob (ha ha)
                                                  [
      42  bb:                                     right
      43  g:   tested his mettle
                          [
      44  b:              John and I are hustling our tails off here
                                                              [
      45  bb + j:                                             ha ha
      46  b:   He was . asleep back there
```

I conceive of conversation as, among other things, an elaborate filter, through which propositions and attitudes must pass in order to be incorporated into a mutually agreed upon, interactively constructed, universe of discourse. Propositions in turn live in a moral universe, which includes not only what participants take to be true, or what they agree to think, but also agreements about *how* to think and feel about what they agree upon. If truth, the business of evidentials, is always tinged with feeling, it remains to be studied in detail how the rapid switches (from irony to sincerity, from doubt to certainty) are engineered and signaled, when, as I think I have shown, the same linguistic devices are used for contradictory ends. The sceptical reader, of course, may retort, 'Sure,-sure!'

Notes

2. 'The Bickersons' was an old-time radio show, with Frances Langford and Don Ameche, which I happened to hear on Bud Carey's Old Time Radio Theater on Berkeley public radio. The rough transcript shown here is from a few fragments I managed to tape. I am unsure of the relevant copyrights, and credits.

Science Foundation Grant #BNS-8011494. My understanding of fights has been especially enhanced by the work of Marjorie H. and Charles Goodwin (see references) and their generous sharing of materials. It is, of course, a frequent observation of students of argument (Schiffrin, 1984; M. Goodwin, 1982, 1982, 1983, 1985; Goodwin and Goodwin, i.p.; Vuchinich, 1984) that *contention* is typically a simple matter of opposition about matters of fact: denials, refusals, contradictions, and the like, often manifested at the *beginnings* of contentious turns.

4. See Haviland (1987a) for a more detailed treatment of the linguistic encoding of evidential categories in Tzotzil.

5. Elinor Ochs and Bambi Schieffelin animated and led discussions on the topic as part of a Working Group on Language in Cultural Context at the Australian National University in 1981. Those who shared their ideas and research materials also included Judith Irvine, Penny Brown, Steve Levinson, Buck Schieffelin, Leslie Devereaux, Sandro Duranti, and Michael Silverstein. It is not easy to disentangle what I say here from what I learned from these friends. See Irvine (1982) for another result of these sessions, which reviews more carefully than I do some of the relevant issues and literature.

6. Regardless of some expert scepticism about the prospects for such an endeavor at all, as for example, that expressed by Needham (1972) and (1981).

7. In a continuing, as yet unpublished, study I discuss a variety of metaphorical devices, seemingly universally available in languages of the world, for locating emotions, personal propensities, and other aspects of our presumed inner lives in pieces of our anatomy; see Haviland (n.d.a.).

8. See Haviland (1987b) for a description of couplets in Zinacanteco ritual speech, the Tzotzil version of the well-known Mayan genre (see Edmonson, 1971;Bricker, 1974). The vast literature on the subject, spawned by Jakobsonean poetics, includes Fox (1977).

9. For more details about Zinacanteco Tzotzil, see Haviland (1981). Transcripts from Zinacanteco Tzotzil are presented in a somewhat simplified version of the standard transcript notation. Tzotzil is written in a Spanish-based practical orthography in which the symbol ' stands for a glottal stop, and the symbol C' represents a glottalized consonant C. Lines correspond roughly to extended utterances broken by pauses. Here the first line of each pair shows the original Tzotzil utterance, while the second line gives a free English gloss. Overlaps and latches are marked with square brackets and equal signs connecting latched turns, and the spacing corresponds to the Tzotzil lines (not to the glosses).

10. Chuck Goodwin (personal communication, 19 Jan. 1987) brought some of these complexities to my attention in his careful reading of this example.

11. It can also, conversely, be a feature of formal praise, prayer and song. Haviland (1987b) presents a more detailed study of formally parallel speech in non-ritual contexts.

12. Chuck Goodwin points out that, if we do away with the somewhat fragile dichotomy between the verbal and the non-verbal, and treat both as complementary aspects of what Adam Kendon (1980a) calls 'the process of utterance,' both presumptions may be understood as arguing that we learn how people are feeling through their *language*, now expanded, as I have already suggested, to include words and gestures.

13. Don Brenneis points out that I am here more properly speaking not of inner states or emotions themselves (however psychologists may propose that these are to be understood), but rather of the cultural constructions people can place upon them.

14. Perhaps surprisingly, to show respect in Tzotzil you can also use couplets; in Guugu Yimidhirr, you can use the respectful vocabulary of 'Brother-in-law' speech; see Haviland 1979a, 1979b.

15. I am indebted to Lourdes de León for confirming this example. Note that Wierzbicka (1980; 1986), suggests a putative semantic analysis of such devices as Spanish diminutives.

16. Normally the dimunitive *hermanito* in, e.g., Mexico City Spanish does *not* imply 'younger brother,' but instead emphasizes the speaker's attitude at the moment of speaking.

17. Lourdes de León has pointed out that the use of the Spanish dimunitive (much like the use of expletives in the baby bear's English sentences cited) suggests that you are aiming your remarks somewhere in your audience: that the affect has an implicit target, or is available to be shared. This is probably true even when such an effective device occurs in an 'out-loud' or a 'response cry' with no explicit audience (Goffman, 1981).

18. Similarly, the absence of affect can be affectively effective: the stony face can be a creative device to keep others silent.

19. Citations from *Through the Looking Glass* are from Carroll (1960).

20. For Whorf's (1938, reprinted 1956: 112–124) version of Hopi, three categories of assertion (reportive, expective, and nomic), overlay four categories of status (affirmative, negative, interrogative, and indefinitive), and these are, in turn, further elaborated by such 'modalities' as quotative ('they say'), inhibitive ('cannot'), potential ('can'), indeterminate ('may'), advisory ('might well happen that ...'), concessive ('apparently,' or 'it is conceded that ...'), necessitative ('inevitably'), impotential ('unsuccessfully' or 'without the desired outcome').

21. More exactly, Jakobson characterizes evidentials *not* in relation to the participants of the speech event, but rather as a category that considers three events: the speech event, the narrated event, and 'the narrated speech event ..., namely the alleged source of information about the narrated event' (Jakobson 1957: 4).

22. The Tzotzil evidentials I present here are more accurately considered *clitics*, although the syntactic details are messy; see Haviland (1987a) for details.

23. In the latter connection, Robert I. Levy has observed that, by contrast and perhaps to prevent such underhanded ploys, taking an oath in our society requires keeping the hands on the table, or displaying the palms.

24. For Tzotzil, these are four elements out of an inventory of some twenty with an evidential flavor. Brown and Levinson (1978) list a similar number of Tzeltal particles and describe their role in politeness phenomena. My interest in these Tzotzil materials was fueled, and my understanding enhanced, by discussions with Penelope Brown in 1980 and 1981. I am also indebted to Anna Wierzbicka for firm and critical suggestions, although I fear I have not followed her rigorous example (see Wierzbicka, 1976; Goddard, 1979).

25. Brown and Levinson (1978: 157) make a similar observation about the cognate Tzeltal particle *lah*, which they count among the 'weakening' or 'hedging' devices that Tzeltal provides. With declaratives the particle allows a speaker to avoid 'responsibility for believing in the truth of the utterance,' whereas with a command it can show '(truly, or as a pretense) that it is a third-party command'—thus acting less as a propositional hedge than as an illocutionary one. Mary Laughren (1981) distinguishes some slightly altered senses for interrogatives and imperatives with an attached Warlpiri hearsay particle.

26. See particularly Levinson (1985; 1986).

27. See Haviland (1986) for an extended treatment of this interaction.

28. In Tzotzil, *nan* can only appear in non-interrogative clauses; in the presence of an interrogative element, *van* occurs instead. Brown and Levinson (1978: 160) describe the Tzeltal cognate *niwan* as a particle that 'suspends the sincerity condition, so that S is

not claiming to be doing the speech act he appears to be doing, or does not take responsibility for the truth of his assertion.'

29. Laughren (1981) notes the existence of sentential particles in Warlpiri that take effect on 'former presuppositions'—that is, presuppositions or implications of previously enunciated propositions.

30. The particle *a'a* is also syntactically distinguished from both *la* and *nan* in that it occurs in utterance-final position, whereas the other two occur in second position in the Tzotzil clause; see Aissen (1987).

31. See Goodwin and Goodwin (i.p.) and references therein, for example.

32. M. Goodwin (1982) analyzes turns, in children's argument, that begin with terms such as 'so,' 'I don't care,' and 'I know,' which she describes as 'disclaimers in turn initial position ... [which] can be followed by a reason for the opposition' (p. 85). She demonstrates a different sort of evidential tactic with a contentious flavor: 'arguing for the irrelevance of a prior speaker's talk—thus, perhaps, for the irrelevance of truth itself, so that such moves are 'especially apt ... following statements whose truth values are not at issue' (p.85). As for the use of turn-initial 'I know' in argument, she points out that '[f]ollowing moves treated as attempts to show up others by delivering news ... a recipient can argue that he already knows what the prior speaker tells him, and can thus be seen as violating an implicit principle organizing much of conversational interaction' (p.85). Her reference is to Sacks (1974: 341 and 1973: 139).

33. I am indebted to Chuck Goodwin for this formulation.

34. Laughlin (1975: 71) analyzes the particle as a conjunction of *yu'* ('because,' from *-u'un*) and the particle *van*, which we have met before as the interrogative form of *nan* 'perhaps.' The etymology suggests a meaning like 'is it perhaps because (of that)?'

35. But, conversely, as Schiffrin (1984) points out, argument and disagreement as conversational forms can often be intended as a form of being *agreeable*, i.e., sociable.

36. See Haviland and Haviland (1983), for a discussion of privacy in Zinacantán.

37. C. Goodwin (1986a), following Schegloff (1982), critizes the undifferentiated notion of 'back-channel' (Yngve 1970), and argues that sequential differences between at least two kinds of hearer response (continuers and assessments) show that speakers design their talk to coordinate with their interlocutors' speech. The heavily overlapped and highly interactive Tzotzil speech of Zinacantecos still awaits detailed sequential treatment of the sort Goodwin provides.

38. The particle *che'e*, usually translated 'then' (or Spanish *pues*) also marks a kind of agreement, something like 'of course'.

39. The example makes plain a fact much discussed recently, that the classic but unexamined dichotomy between Speaker and Hearer often obscures the active collaboration of what I have called the 'textured audience.' See Holmes (1984), C. Goodwin (1986b), Haviland (1986), and especially Levinson (1986),for an elaboration of this theme.

Strikingly, in this conversational passage, we can distinguish the *real* intended target for the talk as different from either principal Speaker or his Interlocutor. Partly this is a matter of simple pronoun use: in the hypothetical example Lol offers, he talks about how *he himself* would act when drunk. Thus, at line 1 he says 'I am without blame when I wake up', using first person prefixes on *j-mul* 'my sin, my misdeed' and *ch-i-sakub* 'I wake up (in the morning).' But in line 20, at the end of the fragment, he changes the subject and begins to tell the wife, using second person pronouns, how *she* should behave, in the passage that follows.

40. Inflected forms of the transitive verb root *-na'* 'know' often seem to reveal manipulative evidential strategy. Ordinarily *a-na'-oj*, the stative or perfective second person form,

contrasts with the incompletive *x-a-na'*, in that the former is almost always ironic and the latter non-ironic. Hence, with the question *mi chbat*? 'is he going?', one has

Mi chbat ana'oj? Is he going, do you think? (Implies: of course not, you idiot!)
Mi chbat xana'? Is he going, do you think. (Implies: I want to know what *you* think.)

41. Lol make a (somewhat tired) pun on the word *ulo'* 'visitor' (which Zinacantecos and Chamulas use reciprocally as address terms for each other), but adding a first person possessive prefix, to produce *kulo'*, a homophone with a vulgar Spanish word for 'anus'.

42. Penelope Brown (1981) describes the basic Tzeltal device for constructing ironic assertions:

yu?un + Proposition + {Question particle}
{
{Hedging particle}

Note the morphological similarity with Tzotzil *yu'van*, analyzable as *yu'un* 'because' plus the interrogative form *van* of *nan* 'perhaps'. One of Brown's ironic Tzeltal examples:

yu?un   niwan   ya   h-k'an   ya   h-ta   mul   ya   ka?y
because perhaps ASP I-want   ASP I-find crime ASP I-feel
Because perhaps I want to find trouble, I know

which conversationally implicates 'Of course I don't!', would most naturally translate into a Tzotzil sentence with *yu'van*.

43. Notably, when anger *does* surface in these volleyball games, which are normally immune to such overt hostilities, the vehicle is often an increased dose of sincerity, buttressed by quiet evidential augmentatives (see the 'honestly' and related devices at 391, the exaggerated sentiments of 392, or the marked use of C's name in R's answer at line 396, in the following excerpt).

(32)   (voltext)
387   p: that was good
388   brilliant serve
389   n: NO I **honestly** didn't think so
390   r: I thought it was out
391   n: I **honestly** thought it was out **myself**
392   what a pity
393   db: it's your call
394   c: what'd you think, Robert
395   b: it's your call
396   r: **I saw it out, Carol**
397   p: huh
398   c: **I believe him**

I gathered these volleyball transcripts during my stay at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in 1985–86. I am grateful for my fellow Fellows' patience.

References

Aissen, Judith (1987). *Tzotzil Clause Structure*. Reidel.
Aristotle (1941). *The Basic Works of Aristotle*. Richard McKeon (ed.). New York: Random House.

Austin, J.L. (1961). *Philosophical Papers*. London: Oxford University Press.
Bateson, Gregory (1968). Redundancy and coding. In T.A. Sebeok (ed.), *Animal Communication: Techniques of Study and Results of Research*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Brenneis, Donald and Laura Lein (1977). 'You fruithead': a sociolinguistic approach to children's disputes. In Susan Ervin-Tripp and Claudia Mitchell-Kernan (eds.), *Child Discourse*. New York: Academic Press, 49–66.
Bricker, Victoria R. (1973). *Ritual Humor in Highland Chiapas*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Brown, Penelope (1981). Conversational phenomena in Tzeltal. Presentation to Discourse Seminar, Australian National University, May 18, 1981.
Brown, Penelope and Stephen Levinson (1978). Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena. In Esther N. Goody (ed.), *Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 56–289.
Carroll, Lewis (1960). *Through the Looking Glass*. New York: Signet.
DeLancey, Scott (1985). Lhasa Tibetan evidentials and the semantics of causation. *Proc. of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*, pp. 65–72.
Dixon, R.M.W. (1971). A method of semantic description. In Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (eds.), *Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 436–471.
Edmonson, M.S. (1971). *The Book of Counsel: The Popol Vuh of the Quiche Maya of Guatemala*. Middle American Research Institute Publication 35. New Orleans, La.
Ekman, Paul (1976). Movements with precise meanings. *Journal of Communication* 26: 14–26.
— (1977). Biological and cultural contributions to body and facial movement. In John Blacking (ed.), *The Anthropology of the Body*. New York: Academic Press, pp. 39–84.
Fox, James J. (1977). Roman Jakobson and the comparative study of parallelism. In D. Armstrong and C.H. van Schooneveld (eds.), *Roman Jakobson: Echoes of his Scholarship*. Lisse: Peter de Ridder, pp. 59–90.
Goddard, Cliff (1979). Particles and illocutionary semantics. *Papers in Linguistics*. 12(1–2): 185–230. Spring–Summer 1979.
Goffman, Erving (1981). *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Goodwin, Charles (1986a). Between and within: Alternative sequential treatments of continuers and assessments. *Human Studies* 9: 205–217.
— (1986b). Audience diversity, participation and interpretation. *Text* 6(3): 283–316.
Goodwin, Marjorie H. (1980). He-said-she-said: formal cultural procedures for the construction of a gossip dispute activity. *American Ethnologist* 7: 674–695.
— (1982). Processes of dispute management among urban black children. *American Ethnologist* 9(1): 76–96.
— (1985). The serious side of jump rope: conversational practices and social organization in the frame of play. *Journal of American Folklore* 98: 315–330.
Goodwin, Marjorie H. and Charles Goodwin (In press). Children's arguing. In Susan Phillips, Susan Steele and Christina Tanz (eds.), *Language, Gender and Sex in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grice, H.P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts*. New York: Academic Press, pp. 41–58.
Haviland, John B. (1979a). Guugu Yimidhirr brother-in-law language. *Language in Society* 8: 365–393.
Haviland, John B. (1981). *Sk'op Sotz'leb: El Tzotzil de San Lorenzo Zinacantán*. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
— (1986). Con buenos chiles: talk, targets, and teasing in Zinacantán. *Text* 6(3): 249–282.

— (1987). Fighting Words: evidential particles, affect and argument. *Proceedings of the 13th Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*.
— (1987). Ritual speech without ritual in Zinacantan. Ms.
— (n.d.a.) Body part metaphor. Ms.
Haviland, Leslie K. and John B. Haviland (1983). Privacy in a Mexican village. In S.I. Benn and G.F. Gauss (eds.), *Public and Private in Social Life*. London: Croom Helm, pp. 341–361.
Holmes, Dick (1984). Explicit-implicit address. *Journal of Pragmatics* 8: 311–320
Irvine, Judith T. (1982). Language and affect: some cross-cultural issues. *GURT 1982: Contemporary perceptions of language*.
Jakobson, Roman (1957). Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian verb. Russian Language Project, Dept. of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Harvard University.
Kendon, Adam (1980). Gesticulation and speech: two aspects of the process of utterance. In Mary Ritchie Key (ed.), *Relationship Between Verbal and Nonverbal Communication*. The Hague: Mouton, pp. 207–227.
Kuroda, S-Y. (1973). Where epistemology, style, and grammar meet: a case study from Japanese. In S. Anderson and Paul Kiparsky (eds.), *A Festschrift for Morris Halle*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 377–391.
Laughlin, Robert M. (1975). *The Great Tzotzil Dictionary of San Lorenzo Zinacantan*. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution.
Laughren, Mary (1981). Propositional particles in Warlpiri. In Steven Swartz (ed.), *Papers in Warlpiri Grammar: In Memory of Lothar Jagst*. Darwin, N.T.: SIL, Australia Branch.
Levinson, Stephen (1981). On the grammaticalization of affect in natural languages. Ms., Australian National University, Working Group on Language in Cultural Context.
— (1983). *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— (1985). Minimization and conversational inference. Paper delivered to the International Pragmatics Conference at Viareggio, Italy. September, 1985.
— (1986). Putting linguistics on a proper footing: explorations in Goffman's concepts of participation. Paper presented to the conference 'Erving Goffman: an interdisciplinary appreciation,' York, July 1986.
Malinowski, Bronislaw (1935). *Coral Gardens and Their Magic, vol 2*. London: Allen and Unwin.
Needham, Rodney (1972). *Belief, Language, and Experience*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
— (1981). *Circumstantial Deliveries*. Berkeley: University of California.
Sacks, Harvey (1973). On some puns: with some intimations. In Roger W. Shuy (ed.), *Report of the 23rd Annual Round Table on Linguistics and Language Studies*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 135–144.
— (1974). An analysis of the course of a joke's telling in conversation. In Richard Bauman and Joel Sherzer (eds.), *Explorations in the ethnography of speaking*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 337–353.
— (1975). Everyone has to lie. In B. Blount and M. Sanches (eds.), *Sociocultural Dimensions of Language Use*. New York: Academic Press, pp. 57–80.
Schegloff, Emmanuel (1982). Discourse as an interactional achievement: some uses of 'uh huh' and other things that come between sentences. In D. Tannen (ed.), *Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Schiffrin, Deborah (1984). Jewish argument as sociability. *Language in Society* 13: 311–335.
Silverstein, Michael (1985). The functional stratification of language and ontogenesis. In

James V. Wertsch (ed.), *Culture, Communication, and Cognition: Vygotskian Perspectives.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 205–235.

Vogt, Evon Z. (1969). *Zinacantan: a Maya community in the highlands of Chiapas.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

—— (1976). *Tortillas for the Gods: a symbolic analysis of Zinacanteco rituals.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Vuchinich, Samuel (1984). Sequencing and social structure in family conflict. *Social Psychology Quarterly* 47: 217–234.

Whorf, Benjamin L. (1956). *Language, Thought, and Reality.* In John B. Carroll (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Wierzbicka, Anna (1976). Particles and linguistic relativity. *International Review of Slavic Linguistics* 1(2–3): 327–367.

—— (1980). *Lingua Mentalis.* Sydney, New York: Academic Press.

—— (1986). Does language reflect culture? Some evidence from Australian English. *Language in Society* 15(3): 349–374.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1952). *Philosophical Investigations.* New York: Macmillan.

Yngve,V.H. (1970). On getting a word in edgewise. In M.A. Campbell (ed.), *Papers from the Sixth Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistics Society,* Chicago: Dept. of Linguistics, University of Chicago.

John Haviland is Professor of Anthropology and Linguistics at Reed College. He is an anthropologist, with interests in language in social life, who has worked among Tzotzil Mayan peasant Indians in Chiapas, Mexico, Guugu Yimidhirr speaking Aborigines in northeastern Australia, and Mixtec migrant workers in Oregon. He has been a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and has taught at Harvard, the Australian National University, and the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.