

of the artistic merits of the performance, despite the obvious interest and partiality. This partiality may not at all impede her aesthetic sensitivity; it might make her look all the harder and all the more critically; she might feel the boy's failures all the more. What seems to be true, then, in this rather superficial reading of Kant, is not that partiality is incompatible with making judgements of taste (hence, with aesthetic attitude), but that partiality need make no difference in such judgements.

What sort of requirement does the aesthetic attitude put on the observer? Bullough's theory and milder ones postulate an elaborate psychological state to be necessary to aesthetic experience. As a state, Distance is incompatible with anxiety, with "fears of invisible dangers" and with strain or nervousness.<sup>28</sup> Cohen points out that, whether or not the psychological claims of the theory are reasonable, Bullough often regards his psychological preconditions as marking out particular behavior, in particular, as ruling out certain actions in practical response to art: e.g., the yokel's jump onto the stage.<sup>29</sup> The jealous husband at Othello will have a heightened appreciation of the play, so long as he maintains proper distance, presumably by pinching himself whenever his personal feelings try to enter. If he manages, he will not walk out of the theater. In the end, however, a behavioral criterion for Distance melts into a perceptual criterion. Consider a theory that defines aesthetic attitude as attending to a work in a certain way, namely, disinterestedly. Using such a definition we need presuppose no psychological state; we merely describe the way one ought to attend to a work of art, and, as part of this description, we rule out certain practical interest and involvement. The variants are, then: psychological, behavioral

and perceptual.

The theory of aesthetic attitude will not do in any of these forms for reasons which may be very briefly summarized. It is simply not true that aesthetic appreciation is marred by (just any) psychological states like anxiety or fear. One reaction to someone who defines aesthetic attitude by excluding such states is to say: "But you must be thinking of only certain sorts of works of art, especially things like soft, beautiful, pastoral music or certain sorts of sweet comedy. Perhaps, too, you are thinking about the appreciation of unusual things like fog or bullfights." Cohen writes:

"Surely, anxiety, tension, and stress, which Bullough takes to be incompatible with aesthetic experience, are in fact essential to the effects not only of detective fiction (from Oedipus to the present) but (to suggest only obvious sources) such metaphysical poetry, Sturm und Drang music, and expressionist painting. The muzzles of the battleship Potemkin,<sup>30</sup> pointed at the audience, are positively menacing."

It is worth noting that it would be extremely difficult to draw a line to exclude psychological states of a certain degree from aesthetic experience. It seems at least plausible that an 'aesthetic appreciation' of Bullough's fog at sea might well involve a very personal sense of danger, a tingling of stomach and quickness of pulse which might heighten rather than destroy the fog's beauty, the "strange solitude and remoteness from the world" that Bullough describes. Without such feelings, in fact, the experience loses much of its life. Though for some art there may be no question of anxiety, some works may strive positively to create it. The notion of dis-  
nection, for it  
gives us a place to stand, as it were, to criticize certain abbera-

tions. That is, we can make sense of the notion, and it is then possible to say of a work of art that it does not allow one to maintain distance: if, for instance, its subject matter is highly moving or if it touches one in a direct way. The term has critical uses. But to say that a work fails as art because of a defect in its 'distanceability' (philosophical words are easy to bend) is not to offer a reason, but to give an explanation which requires more argument.

Consider the perceptual variant of the theory. George Dickie's argument against the 'seeing in a certain way' attitude theory may be summarized as follows. (1) The attention of the interested spectator (i.e., the one who attends interestedly, or not disinterestedly) is not "different in kind from that of the ordinary spectator", (i.e., the one with disinterested, and hopefully aesthetic attention.) (2) Other cases --- daydreaming before a painting, being jealous at a performance of Othello --- are simply cases of not attending.<sup>31</sup> (And (3), the theory is misleading; we will return to this.) Thus, in point (2), Dickie points out that insofar as the jealous husband has his personal problems in mind, even when he is watching the play, he is distracted from it --- not 'attending to it distractedly.' For that last is not attending at all. This seems, as one might say, phenomenologically correct. Dickie adds that often distractions will not destroy one's attention to the play and need not seriously mar one's appreciation. But the discussion of point (1) seems a bit misdirected. Consider the following examples. (a) Two roommates listen to a musical piece; one is cramming for a music exam on the following day, while the other is listening for pleasure. (b) A playwright and an ordinary playgoer watch the same rehearsal

of a play, the first with a view to rewriting it. (c) Two men read a poem; one reads it 'the normal way', while the other reads it as data for a psychological study of the author; or, while the other looks for social criticism. Dickie wants to make a similar move in all three cases. He says variously: (a) "There is only one way to listen (to attend) to music."<sup>32</sup> (b) The attention of the playwright is the same as the ordinary man's. (c) "An interest may lead a reader to concentrate his attention on certain 'informational' aspects of a poem and to ignore the remaining aspects..." "...As deplorable as such a sustained practice may be, it is at best a case of attending to certain features of a poem and ignoring others."<sup>33</sup> That is, it is not a case of a different sort of attending. Dickie slips into a view to be discussed more generally in the next section: namely, that the actual perception or attitude is the same for both the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic observer; but attention in these cases is directed at different features, different aspects of the work. Why should we insist on this? It does not seem safe from Dickie's own point of view; and it seems wrong to boot. We leave open to the aesthetic attitude-theorist the following move: extend the argument to say that attending to certain aspects of a work is compatible with aesthetic experience, but attending to certain others is not --- hence, a new definition of aesthetic attitude.

There is an easier, less misleading way to counter the attitude theory here. It seems at best oversimplifying to say that there is only one way to listen to music; or to say that the attention of the playwright and of the ordinary man do not differ in kind, but are merely directed at different features. Both roommates may listen for thematic development; but the one with the exam may try to achieve

a clearer, more expressible understanding of such development than his more relaxed roommate. Both playwright and spectator may have an interest in a play's plot; but the playwright may detect weakness in character or fault in dialogue which his less motivated companion accepts as unremarkable. It is difficult to characterize the difference between the 'interested' and 'disinterested' attention in each case; it is sufficient that we understand the difference in this sense: we have an idea what each approach would be like (e.g., we know how one might study a piece of music.)\* The examples are important in proving the attitude theory wrong not by showing that 'interested' and 'disinterested' attention are in these cases both the same; rather, the people involved are doing different things and having different experiences. The cases of 'interested' attention are as important to art, as aesthetically relevant, as their 'disinterested' mates. (It would be possible to investigate the relation between the activities; one is entirely responsive, while the other requires response and something else.) We do not need to exclude students or playwrights from the realm of art.

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\*Professor Cavell has remarked that the relationship between the student's activity and his roommate's is similar to that between practicing and playing an instrument. For, first, the two activities do not compete. Studying is very much like listening, as practicing is like playing. But studying does not replace listening and is in a certain way preparatory to it. Practicing, too, has a definite place in music --- in art --- but it is by no means the whole thing. (It may be a means for acquiring a technique.) It is characteristic, for example, that both when practicing and studying music, we stop every now and then, to play a passage over again. There are special ways these related activities are carried on. In a certain sense, too, the listening or playing is a goal which the other activities help achieve.

Finally, let us return to the behavioral criteria for aesthetic attitude which are displayed in the yokel example. Does the yokel's jumping onto the stage to save the heroine display a lack of proper distance? Is this lack, in fact, the difference between the yokel and the rest of the audience? Imagine this: the yokel falls in love with the heroine the moment she comes on stage. He tries to restrain himself throughout the play as the villain tries to do her dirty. Finally he jumps up, shouting, "I can't stand it any longer!" --- A strange model, indeed! We really cannot imagine such a situation. A better example might be the following. A yokel, walking near a railroad track, sees a villain tying down the heroine. They are --- unbeknownst to him --- movie actors. When he runs up and spoils the shot, his excuse will not be that he failed to maintain distance. He will say, "I didn't know it was a movie." (This yokel must have some sophistication. Again, if he cannot understand what a movie is, then more is lacking than distance.) Our point is that the behavioral manifestations of distance or of the aesthetic attitude otherwise understood can amount to nothing more than knowing "what a play is and ... how one behaves in the theatre,"<sup>34</sup> Once this knowledge is present, certain aberrations are ruled out. "If the yokel learns what it is to go to a play we shall be able to do the play in a field, without costumes, and in prose, and still expect him to react properly."<sup>35</sup>

These considerations lead us to see what is at stake in notions of aesthetic attitude, distance, and disinterest. All that is really supposed for beginning aesthetic experience is a knowledge of what art, in a particular case, is; of what one does with art. Thus, while distance may be a useful metaphor in connection with some works,

definitional quest, again, in a very particular sense: it aims at no secure definition by which we can determine whether x is art, of some kind. It looks for the knowledge the yokel lacks, who doesn't know what a play is or how to behave in a theatre; only here we are all yokels and we need a new idea of what art is.\*

Such problems about aesthetic attitude are not ones easily susceptible to philosophical solution. Philosophy, in fact, must train itself away from a quest for hard definitions in this part of aesthetics. Philosophy may help us decide what to do with works of art. It can offer categories; but it cannot replace the looking.

#### § 5. Aspects

All of the theories we have been working with share a spirit. They all attempt to reduce the range of aesthetic experience by defining it in terms of certain kinds of perception, certain attitudes, knowledge or activities. Some philosophers have criticized the particular theories but salvaged their reductionist spirit by retiring to yet another idea: the aspect. We will make a short study of the notion, which deserves more attention than it has gotten. Can it perform the philosophical tasks arranged for it? Aspect theories come in all shapes and forms --- typically an aesthetic theory about anything can be made into an aspect theory --- but we will

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\*Cavell remarks that what is interesting is the "very possibility of 'yokelhood'."

yokel hood.

consider a 'full-fledged' form and a 'hedging' form.

We will take our full-fledged aspect theory from certain remarks of Paul Ziff in 'Reasons in Art Criticism'. While a great many things may enter into aesthetic experience (or, in the case of Ziff's paper, into aesthetic appreciation), in some very important and well-defined way aspects are the proper concern for aesthetics. Ziff says that "nothing can be a reason why a painting is good or bad unless it is concerned with what can be looked at in the painting, unless it is concerned with what can, in some sense, be seen."<sup>38</sup> This is so because only a reason about something that can be seen, in some sense, will 'guide one in the contemplation of the work.' And exactly the sort of something that can, in some sense, be seen is some sort of aspect; 'see this disorder' points to an aspect in a way that 'this painting was done in Rome' does not. "Suppose one were told: 'Notice that the work was done while the artist was in Rome,' one could reply: 'But what am I supposed to look at?'"<sup>39</sup> We call this theory a full-fledged aspect theory because the meaning of 'aspect' is eventually made clear, and because the role of aspects in aesthetics is more or less carefully outlined. Thus, Ziff contrasts saying 'The painting is a seascape' with saying 'The painting is disorganized'. The first directs attention to the subject matter of the painting, tells us what kind of painting it is. The second directs attention to an aspect of the painting, namely its organization. Aspects have properties of their own. Some aspects, like organization and color, are aspects of all paintings. One can talk about the organization of even the most disorganized painting. Further, some aspects "admit of questions of degree."<sup>40</sup> That is, one simply recognizes that a painting is a seascape: generally, it is or it isn't. But a painting may be more or less organized;



one does not simply notice its organization; one 'contemplates' it.\* In any case, Ziff speaks of pointing to an aspect as referring to a point in a dimension; terms like 'organized' or 'incoherently organized' attribute a "location to the painting in the dimension of organization."<sup>41</sup> Referring to a point in a dimension is doing more than merely directing attention to a dimension, though the same statement may do both. (E.g., a report of subject matter is not a report of an aspect; a report of the handling of subject matter is.) The importance of aspects for Ziff's theory is that only reports on aspects (but not on all aspects) can be reasons why the work is good or bad. This fact is connected with Ziff's more general definition that a good work of art (in particular, of painting) is one for which the performance of the relevant act of aspection ("looking in some way"<sup>42</sup>) is worthwhile. Only a report on aspects can make any difference to the worth of a particular act of aspection. We will return to this below.

Let us now mention a hedging aspect theory. Such a theory may be expected to give a relatively indefinite sense of 'aspect' and to rely heavily on the notion without making its tasks particularly clear. Aspects, as we saw in the last section, can pop up as part of a philosophical retreat: one wants to attack a given theory of aesthetic essence, but one can't entirely shake the notion itself. George Dickie seems to be retreating in this way. Let us consider his remarks with respect to literature, about people who fail to adopt the alleged aesthetic attitude towards it. "Some

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\*We may note that in this respect at least, Ziff has already adopted a special sense of 'aspect'. For often, in normal senses of 'aspect' which we shall discuss below, it may happen that an aspect dawns on us; this dawning is like a flash or recognition.

poems simply are or contain social criticism and a complete reading must not fail to note this fact."<sup>43</sup> The alert reader, evidently, notices social-criticism-aspects. For, "an interest may lead a reader to concentrate his attention (when he does read a poem) on certain 'informational' aspects of the poem and ignore the remaining aspects."<sup>44</sup> Dickie seems to let into the 'aesthetic state' attention to all sorts of aspects relevant to all sorts of interests. He insists, somewhat lamely but in a profound tone, that many works of art have many aspects.<sup>45</sup>

Both theories lead to difficulties over aspects, though some of these are considerably more serious than others. Ziff's usage is more careful, and he makes some points worth making about how to look at art. For, as Pole (among others) has pointed out, we tend to feel that the best criticism "fixes itself most tenaciously on the qualities that are actually in the work of art."<sup>46</sup> Such criticism guides the ordinary observer. One way to make sense of the words 'in the work' is through the word 'aspect'; we can, in some way, point to an aspect in the painting. Alternately: reports on an aspect lead us (direct our attention) towards the painting.

But Ziff's major point is that a work is good or bad according as the interests served by performing the relevant act of aspection are worthwhile. Though all kinds of facts may bear on the appreciation of a painting, only certain facts may be reasons why it is good or bad. How are these reasons connected with aspects? Let us consider the three methods Ziff uses to disallow some given fact about a painting as a reason. First, some facts, for example those which tell us that a painting is of a certain kind (e.g., a seascape), do not refer to an aspect in the requisite sense; thus they aren't

reasons. Second, a painting's color, which is an aspect in an obvious way, and may be a point in a dimension, "is not likely to make any difference to anyone in his contemplation of a painting."<sup>48</sup> Third, some facts about a painting such as its largeness or its revolting subject matter, may make a difference to the contemplation, but they are not aspects in the requisite sense. They render works accessible (or inaccessible) for contemplation. They make a work worth contemplating "well worth contemplating". Thus they cannot be the basis for reasons. In that case, the notion of 'aspect' mixed with notions like 'worth of contemplation' seems to be doing extra work in excluding parts of paintings from the domain of criticism or of contemplation in Ziff's extended senses. But some elements of paintings --- let alone the other arts --- refuse to be classified among aspects in any obvious way. Thus, is the expression of a painted face part of the subject matter of a painting, or an aspect, a point in some dimension? If we are tempted to say the former, then think of a painting of which we say: "Notice that she's smiling, or almost smiling --- well, maybe that is no smile at all." It might be worthwhile to contemplate the painting simply because of the wonderful smile/not-smile. And when a color does make a difference, has it suddenly become the proper kind of aspect? Sibley contrasts the expressions 'so blue' and 'such a blue'.<sup>49</sup> Each has a different feeling, and each points, as it were, to something different about the color. Is it obvious in a given case whether "And the sky has such a blue..." or any other report on an aspect will qualify as a reason? May we not marvel at an artist's use of color? Finally we seem to be able to make even a painting's largeness into an aspect. For, we can conceive of a painting which

contemplation well worthwhile; if the painting were small it would be ridiculous, laughable, no good at all. It may be true that size alone is an insufficient reason; but in a similar way, it is a rare painting that can stand on its organization alone --- such a work might better be called a design. The thrust of these remarks is that 'aspect' in Ziff's narrow sense excludes too much which we might want to call 'aspect'.\* And aspects in some broader sense might make better reasons than Ziff supposes. What Ziff has to say about reasons and features of a work which can be, in one way or another, aspected is relatively clear. But, true or not, aspects in the restricted sense cannot do the job.

Hedging theories are easier to criticize because they say almost nothing. If it is not generally possible to distinguish aesthetic attitude from various non-aesthetic attitudes, then there is at least a place for the argument that we can speak of attention to historical aspects, psychological aspects, and, presumably, aesthetic aspects of works of art. (Or are all aspects of a work of art aesthetic ones?) In arguing against this way of speaking we do not say that it makes no sense to speak of a poem, say, as having 'informational aspects.' If some weighty conclusion is to be drawn for aesthetics, however, we must be clear about what such aspects can do for our theory. Many works have many aspects, Dickie tells us, and a complete experience will not ignore them. This aspect

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\*In fact, he gives but one definite example of the proper sort of aspect: namely, what is called to our attention in saying 'Note the organization.'

formula, we contend, is at best useless, and at worst misleading: it gives us no hints about what we do in reading a poem. That is, to say 'One must attend to all of a poem's aspects, be they historical, moral, or aesthetic' tells us nothing; for so far, anything that we may notice about a poem may be an aspect --- and we are left where we began with respect to the poem, except that we have put the reader on guard for all kinds of separable aspects. (This last is clearly a mistake for some poems.) All we have said is 'Read the poem, and get out of it what you can.' It does not take philosophy to get us this far.

In any case, we seem in a muddle about aspects. On the one hand, if the notion is made strong, it begins to exclude from art what would be better left in. If it is weak, then it excludes nothing and, in fact, says nothing. Here is an area where philosophy can do its proper task, and perhaps shed some light on aesthetic problems, too. For there are a number of profitable investigations left with respect to aspects which seem to have some bearing on art. We will make a brief start on some of these, expecting modest results.

First, we may try to discover what aspects are in our normal experience.\* The quarrel with the philosophical use of the word is not a quarrel with any use. Generally, to say that some object has many aspects is to say that we can look at it in many ways. We are not, in any literal sense, talking about something that a

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\*Strictly speaking, in our use of Wittgenstein's sense of 'aspect' we do not claim to be setting out the complete ordinary use of the word. His investigation is interesting because it represents a development more or less independent of aesthetic considerations. Yet, his 'results' are of use to us.

thing has. This is evidently the sense Wittgenstein has in mind:

"I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience 'noticing an aspect.'<sup>50</sup>

We could best discover what is happening here by examining the grammar of certain phrases. For example, Wittgenstein distinguishes between the 'continuous seeing' of an aspect and the 'dawning' of an aspect. For, with his duck rabbit it would be possible never to see the duck, but only the rabbit. And one would suddenly see the rabbit with a sort of surprise.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, we may speak of the 'changing of an aspect' (e.g., of a two-dimensional drawing of a cube). The experience of seeing it alternately as concave or convex is familiar. In this sense, too, we can say that the aspect changes while the picture itself does not. One might say: our interpretation changes much as we may interpret the same face in more than one way. (We may describe it differently, mimic it differently.)

Seeing an aspect can be like recognition. To use another Wittgensteinian word, the dawning of an aspect is like a materialization.<sup>52</sup> A figure may emerge from a previously unintelligible painting; then the rest of the picture falls together. Here is the 'seeing in a new way' that the critic can produce. And such 'seeing aspects' can be distinguished from ordinary seeing. Thus, it is odd to speak of a conventional drawing of a face by saying: "Now it's a face!" We might ask: "Well, what was it before? What has changed?" Furthermore, though it is perfectly possible to miss an aspect --- never to have it dawn, for example --- there are problems with asking, once one has seen an aspect, "For how long did you see it?" Wittgenstein gives some examples of what we should answer in such

a case, e.g., that after a few minutes we stopped being struck by the aspect. But

"...if he says he is aware of it /e.g., of the depth of a design/ only occasionally (when talking about it, perhaps) --- do I believe that? These answers will strike me as resting on a false foundation. --- It will be different if he says that the object sometimes strikes him as flat, sometimes as three-dimensional."<sup>53</sup>

One final point about 'seeing aspects' involves the way that one can notice an aspect, and then be able (or unable) to describe it. For often, to reproduce the picture exactly will not be the best way to represent the aspect you saw.\* In general, the descriptions of a picture by people who have seen different aspects of it will differ in certain ways. Imagine the different descriptions of people who see the rabbit, and those who just see dashes and lines.

"If someone sees a smile and does not know it for a smile, does not understand it as such, does he see it differently from someone who understands it? --- He minds it differently, for instance."<sup>54</sup>

Wittgenstein says a good deal more about his notion of 'seeing aspects' --- much of it cruelly obscure. We have enough, however, to get a look at some of the problems about 'aspect' for our study. As Wittgenstein points out, aesthetic conversations make use of expression about seeing aspects in just his sense. "You have to see it like this, this is how it is meant."<sup>55</sup> Aspects are seen in painting, heard in music (as we recognize a theme as a variation), and perhaps felt in poetry (as we are struck or gripped by an image).

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\*It is worth noting that 'to reproduce the picture exactly' could mean showing a reproduction of the picture. We might do this to point out which one we saw. But if we are asked to reproduce the picture as exactly as we can, what we draw will be determined by what we saw. (Compare, Philosophical Investigations, p. 204e. In reproducing a drawing, "there are certain mistakes I should not make.")

Clearly we could find more examples. It is worth noting that Ziff's aspects are somewhat narrower than Wittgenstein's, while Dickie's are considerably broader. For Ziff, aspects presumably do not dawn; seeing them requires more than recognition; one must contemplate them or study them to locate the point in the dimension. For Dickie, aspects can be missed, ignored, and slighted. Though they are, as we shall say, larger than Wittgenstein's, similar things can be said. One might say to a playgoer: you have missed the social aspect of the play, its inherent social criticism. Similarly, one might say: "That painted face is not really smiling; you miss the somewhat ambiguous expression in the eyes, around the nose. Doesn't the smile seem a bit sour, a bit forced?" Or, one might claim: "The author makes you laugh, but there is sarcasm and bitterness behind his humor --- don't you feel it?" All of these expressions may be considered to be about aspects relevant to art; and about their detection and description.

The point of this investigation is to delimit the usefulness of aspects in talking about art. We must deny any attempt to define art in terms of certain high-fallutin' aspects. We cannot, thus, accept any theory which would make 'seeing aspects' the sole or supreme aesthetically relevant activity; nor have we any use for the idea that a 'complete' experience of a work of art is a matter of considering all its aspects. These theories are unacceptable because they explain nothing and put too much philosophical weight on the word 'aspect'. Again we may turn to Wittgenstein. An aspect is not something an object, say a painting, has --- not in the way it has color, or weight, or even shape. "Seeing aspects" is something we do with paintings; and it is more than one thing. We are inclined



to say that we must know certain things to see aspects; e.g., we know how to see them, how to describe them, how to get people to notice them. Put another way, the language games of seeing aspects are themselves determined by our relationship to art. Wittgenstein's 'aspect-blind' man, who cannot see the change in aspects, for whom aspects never dawn, is almost unintelligible to us. "The 'aspect-blind' will have an altogether different relationship to pictures from ours."<sup>56</sup> "Seeing aspects' is something we learn to do in a very natural way. But to say that we learn to see aspects is not to say that we can, in any simple way, show someone else how to do it. It is not as if we could teach a technique, like squinting or staring fixedly at a point. One might be able to do all this --- squint, trace designs in the air --- and have no idea what to look for. Seeing aspects requires the capability of "making certain applications."<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, we may have whatever technique there is to seeing aspects, and yet not get the aspect to click into view. (Remember the frustration of not being able to get the right sense of perspective in some drawings. In a similar way, we feel helpless trying to teach the 'aspect-blind' man.) It is true and unsurprising that we see (hear, feel) aspects in art: this is one way we might describe something that goes on. We must not suppose, however, that knowing what it is to see aspects will tell us what to do with art; rather, it is art which will teach us how to see aspects, which aspects to see.

We will conclude this chapter with an investigation of an expression closely related to the sense of 'seeing aspects' developed above. The investigation is more basic; often the phenomenon of seeing aspects is described with terms like "He saw figure A

first as x, and then as y." It is important in art to point out any uncertainty in the usage of 'seeing... as' and kin expressions.

(i) In art we are often tempted to adopt the 'see...as..' formula. "I see the picture as a face." But Wittgenstein makes the important point that we do not always use this expression. Sometimes it is improper. Hence, "I cannot try to see a conventional picture of a lion as a lion, any more than an F as that letter."<sup>58</sup> When there is no question, you don't see the picture as a face; you see the face. We might advance a similar explanation in other arts: when there is no question that a play is social criticism, you don't attend to it as social criticism; you pay attention to the play, social criticism and all. (You may succeed in ignoring the social criticism; but to say that generally social criticism has no place in drama is, foremost, to give a statement of preference.)

(ii) Why do philosophers adopt the words "see ... as..." at all? There seems to be the feeling that in art we are doing something that is seeing, but not regular seeing. That is, to say that when we look at some lines we see a face might --- were it not for the ordinariness of such experiences --- sound truly odd. Do the lines conjure up a hallucination? The answer is: "No, I see the lines as a face." We do not pretend that the lines form a face (i.e., that everything is there, as it were, in our mental picture.) It is rather that with an unconventional drawing someone might look and see nothing but lines, until we say "See it as a face: these dots are the eyes..." Contrast the commands "See this face ..." and "See this as a face...": Sometimes, the second command would get results where the first would get blank stares. Once it is clear why we feel the need for special words (clearly, there is more to

it than what we have said), we have a better idea what "see ... as..." can do for us.

(iii) In cases where we do say that we are seeing x as y we have ways of explaining ourselves. That is, if we describe a painted face thus: "I see the smile as deceitful"; then there are certain stories we might make up to represent our impression. We might mimic the expression.<sup>59</sup> It is important that we have ways of getting behind a painted person, or a character in a play, much as we do with real people. We may have to imagine more than we see. Consider, too, "I see that line as a hand." I might go on to point out the fingers; or the rest of the body; or the particular grasping look of the line. As Wittgenstein points out, the most important part of a 'see... as..' expression is the explanation, or "representation of 'what is seen'."<sup>60</sup>

(iv) 'Seeing as..' suggests a comparison, where none is in question. "'Seeing dashes as a face' does not involve a comparison between a group of dashes and a real human face."<sup>61</sup> Wittgenstein claims that 'seeing...as..' is really a kind of interpretation. The importance of this claim is partly that it ignores the temptation to think that what we see the thing as is in any sense separable from the thing itself. In absorbing the expression of a face "I don't find a prototype of this expression in my mind; rather I, as it were, cut a seal from the impression."<sup>62</sup> We have a similar idea that one's interpretation of a work of art is in a most obvious way attached to it --- one's interpretation of a piece of music is playing it this way.

(v) 'Seeing as' implies more than plain 'seeing' with respect, then, to both the object seen and the person seeing. One only sees

x as something when there is some question about it, or when one could make up an example to show that one might not see x as something. And 'seeing as' requires that the observer must react in certain ways to what he sees: he must be able to imagine certain things, to explain what he sees. This is part of the language-game. "I see that cloud as a winged horse" leaves one open to the question "Where are the wings?" The requirements on the observer who uses these expressions have consequences for our theory.

Notably, consider the mysterious dictum 'see a play (e.g.) as a play.' Dickie<sup>63</sup> enumerates two meaningful ways one might interpret this injunction, each of which makes certain presuppositions about the observer. (a) 'Seeing a play as a play' could be contrasted with seeing it 'as a bit of real life.' In this case, to see it as a play would be, simply, to know that it is a play and not 'real' --- this is not a case of seeing at all. (b) "Seeing a play as a play' could exclude 'seeing it as anti-Papal propaganda' (e.g., The Deputy). The suggestion "see it not only as a play" would mean that we must not see it merely as a certain dramatic form and ignore other elements. (Hopefully, the idea is expressed without circularity.) This is related to our earlier discussion. It is at least clear that ignoring social criticism or moral vision takes a rather conscious effort with many plays and novels.

(vi) We may finally consider the Aikenesque position which proposes 'normative' senses of aesthetic. Aesthetic objects are taken to be those seen as, appreciated as, or treated as works of art. We can imagine cases where these expressions might be used, although they are rather specialized. A man might be examining a large piece of pottery. The command "Treat it as a piece of art!"

might then mean only to be careful, to handle it delicately. Similarly, if a museum guide points to a primitive hand-axe saying "Look at it as a piece of art" we might marvel at the deftness of its construction and the grace of its fluted edge. The unfortunate thing here is that nothing can rest on the phrase "see...as a work of art." If those words are to have an effective meaning, the observer must already know how one treats art. The words 'treat as art' already presuppose a whole realm of activities from prizing to contemplating. In this way, if some one were to hand us a book saying "appreciate this as a chemical compound" (which it surely is in some ways), we do not know what to do if we do not already know about chemistry. The analogy is imperfect but its force is obvious.

In this section we have tried to unpack the notion of 'seeing aspects' in its various forms. The aim has been to show that, insofar as aspects play a role in art, there are prior kinds of knowledge that make the notion of 'aspect' a useful analytical tool. The biggest obstacle to an aesthetic theory based on aspects, however, is the multiplicity of possible senses of the word. The first job of a theoretician must be to make us understand the concepts he lays the most weight on.

#### Chapter IV

Our investigation so far has been directed against theories whose general motivation was to define aesthetic experience by reference to appearances, activities, attitudes or aspects. We have tried first to display the crippling uniformity which these notions would impose upon art and second to get behind the crucial words to show that they cannot support their philosophical burdens. In this section and the next we shall make some brief beginnings in a study of aesthetic judgement. Our conviction is that, though the tradition has produced few results, philosophical analysis can illuminate crucial notions in art.

Philosophy has an especially fruitful area of investigation in aesthetic judgement. Art is a public institution; that is, we make all kinds of statements about art, and these statements are subject to public scrutiny and discussion. (At least, this is one way art is public.) We may examine requirements put on these statements: structural and grammatical requirements, as well as substantive ones. The aim is to discover peculiarities in art and its surrounding institutions (e.g., criticism), and to gain some degree of perspicuity. In this section we will survey two kinds of logical (grammatical) requirement: (i) that aesthetic judgements be, in that peculiar sense, universalizable; and (ii) that aesthetic judgements have certain sorts of supporting reasons. In the next section we will consider a substantive requirement: the criteria of relevance to which aesthetic judgements are subject.

(1) There has been considerable discussion of the fact, noted perhaps most importantly by Kant, that aesthetic judgements are subjective, yet made with a universal voice.<sup>1</sup> The claim is made clear by Kant's examples: note the difference between saying "This thing is pleasant" and "This thing is beautiful." For, to the former statement one might be inclined to add "for me". One cannot in the same way say "This thing is beautiful, for me" because one "must not call it beautiful if it merely pleases /one/self." We must be sure that in making judgements of beauty the satisfaction is intended to involve everyone. We speak as if claiming that everyone does (and should) agree with us. Without this claim "it would never come into our thoughts to use the expression at all." We may interpret Kant's words with Cavell, who relates this claim about our linguistic usage to the appeal of ordinary language philosophers to "what 'we' say and mean, or cannot or must say or mean."<sup>2</sup> The requirement of 'universalizability' is what might be variously called a logical or grammatical requirement on aesthetic judgements. The requirement exists in the face of considerable disagreement about aesthetic matters.

Determining how far it is true that we speak with a universal voice in aesthetics becomes an interesting philosophical problem about the institution of art. This feature of aesthetic judgements derives from the fact that experiencing works of art is at once public and private. These are rather loose words. Experiencing art is a private, or individual affair, not because others are excluded from 'my' experience, but because obviously enough I must do some work. I must look, listen, read, feel etc., if I am to get anywhere in art. Here is another basis for the idea that what the critic talks about

must be 'in the work of art', or that others can give at best 'reasons to suppose' such and such about a work. These are true claims insofar as they reaffirm that there must come a point in any work of art where we must open our eyes and look for ourselves.\* To know about art at second hand is not to know about art at all. In what sense, then, is it true that art is public; or, to make the answer less obvious, how does art's being public affect judgements in aesthetics? We venture that judgements about art are public because when they are spoken, we intend that they be taken as universal, in Kant's sense.† That is, we operate on the basis that if anyone else looks, he will see it, too. People may not see it, too; but there must be at least the hope that they will, if only we point well enough. Criticism rests on such facts. One thing the critic does is return his audience to the work to share an experience. Or, alternatively, the critic may point to line, continuity, organization, development. If we pay attention, then we will see in a new way.<sup>4</sup> The measure of a critic's success is not how much he manages to say about a work. It is rather how much he manages to say with which we can agree from our experience of the work, both with and without his words in mind. It is universalizability that led Tolstoy to demand art which every-

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\* We might note, at this point, that even 'looking for ourselves' implies something public. That is, aspects that we may see may well depend on our being able to do something with them. We need to make some interpretation of what we see even to see it. If this seems strange, think how we learn to use drawings, stylized representations. We may also record Wittgenstein's anthropological point: (p.201e) that "culture and upbringing have something to do with what we see in such cases."

† There is another important way that art is public: the artist intends to be understood by a public, not matter how small. There are important points here, too, and tantalizing ones.



one could understand, which was available to all men. But Tolstoy got it wrong. Clearly, not all art is equally accessible, nor will we ever get empirical verification for aesthetic judgements from all members of the brotherhood of man. It is still true, however, that the man who says, "This poem may seem chaotic, but in fact it is quite pointed", but who cannot (or will not) then begin to help us share his view, will have little influence with us. We cannot, for example, always know what he means. Another way of saying this is that there must be some common ground from which we can work in art; it is not a common ground we can acknowledge, although we can appreciate the fact that someone else is not playing our game.

(1) Does our making aesthetic judgements always presuppose that we have reasons for them? Clearly, giving our reasons for judgements is one way to secure the agreement mentioned above. We may make a short grammatical study of 'reasons' in art, to see how art's public nature affects conversations in art. The model seems to be: of various facts which support an aesthetic judgement, some are reasons why the judgement is true and others are not. Consider the following cases.

1. (a) That painting is good. (b) Why?  
(a) Because it is well-organized.
2. (a) Because it is a Rembrandt.

I believe that Paul Ziff would say that (1) shows a reason why the painting is good, whereas (2) shows only a reason to suppose that the painting is good.<sup>5</sup> One explanation for this difference might be: (1) refers to something we can see or contemplate in the painting. (Though, of course, so does (2) in a very regular, if different way.) Sibley gives another way to draw the distinction. "A may in fact be the reason something is B, and yet the knowledge that that

thing has A may provide no reason or justification for supposing that it has B."<sup>6</sup> Thus, presumably a painting might be good because of its organization, though we would probably not say that 'being well-organized' always makes a good painting. We may make the following further contrasts.

3. (a) This poem hangs together. (b) Why?  
(a)1. Well, just listen ...(reads)...  
or (a)2. Note the unity of form, the crystallization  
of one thought.

Here, (a) offers what Sibley calls "perceptual proof" --- a way of justifying a judgement different from reasoned support.<sup>7</sup> Again, Ziff wants to distinguish 'a reason x is so' from 'a sign (or indication) that x is so.' That my teacher doesn't like it may be a sign or an indication that it is bad. But it is not a reason. It may be profitable to insist that reasons are distinguishable from signs or indications, or from reasons to suppose. But this much is true: we offer such and such a fact as a reason for our judgement, if we believe that if the other accepts the fact, he will accept it as a reason. That is, we may point out many facts, all of which leave the other free to say what he will. But at a certain point, we, as it were, demand agreement with what we say. If the other person accepts our facts, he is playing a different game if he doesn't accept our conclusions. So we stop talking.

It makes somewhat more sense to investigate under what conditions we will ask someone to give his reasons, when he will be expected to have reasons (be able to give them), and when he will accept other reasons (make them his own). Although we may have reasons for many of our judgements, it does not always make sense to ask "For what reasons?" That is, we cannot give reasons.

1. "That is a terrible painting." "For what reasons? Why?"
2. "I don't like that painting." "Why not? For what reason?"
3. "That line is so graceful." "Why do you say that? What do you mean?"
4. "Such a blue!" "What about it?"

In example 1, the request for reasons seems usually justified. (We can imagine cases where both people would grimace together before the painting and move on in agreement; or where a look would give all reasons.) Example 2 does not demand reasons in the same way. Statements like that in 2 always seem to leave the option of saying "I don't know why; I just don't like it somehow." (A characteristic remark with many films.) Such a retreat may be dangerous; others may lose regard for such opinions, or think the person in question is a bit fuzzy. But there need be no such result; one may simply be bewildered. In 1, however, there is no chance to say "I don't know; it just is." If we do, then someone can discount us with a simple opinion or preference. If we do, people will pay no attention to our pronouncement (or to us).\*

In examples 3 & 4, however, there is really no question of reasons. In example 3, an answer like "Well, the line has such a graceful curve." would be worse than redundant and circular; it would be no explanation at all. For the questioner in 3 wants to know how a line can even be called graceful. (We could have chosen a more unusual example: "How angry that line looks!") Unfortunately, one is more or less helpless if he tries to explain what his statement means. He can only point and hope that the other speaks English, and will understand. Similarly, in 4 we may be able to suggest that

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\*People are often hostile, in aesthetic conversations, to evident authorities who make confident remarks without giving any reasons. He may know something that they don't but should. But they can't just take his word for it.

"It is the perfect sky blue" or "It seems to fit the mood of the Wittgenstein's phrase, says that reasons in art must come to an end.<sup>9</sup> When there is nothing more to be said, one looks and either sees or does not. With these remarks we have tried to illustrate a philosophical approach to aesthetic judgement. We have only begun to expose the complexity of grammatical problems surrounding these judgements. The powerful thing about philosophy here is that it helps us see the sense behind notions like 'universal voice', or 'unique, un-paraphrasable experience in art.' Critics insist on these notions; we must understand them, to turn them to use in our own traffic with art. With these examples of philosophical investigation in mind, let us make a final lunge at the attempt to draw a line around art.

#### § 7. Aesthetic Relevance

We have characterized the tradition in aesthetics as a definitional quest which has produced only unsatisfactory answers to questions like "What makes a given object art?" or "What distinguishes aesthetic appreciation of art from other kinds?" or "How do we make purely aesthetic judgements?" We have suggested that these questions lead nowhere for philosophy, because they turn us away from a perspicuous view. Trying to solve such problems can be a frustrating experience because we must proceed from the unprofitable assumption that there is some meaningful uniformity in art where none exists. In the last section we suggested that we might philosophize about logical require-

ments on the things we say in art. In much the same way, it is possible to investigate the arts with regard to interpretation, or to survey the various critical activities and examine their preconditions. It is a positive virtue of philosophy that it can bring anything into its investigations. If philosophy cannot solve a problem in art, then we may even investigate why that is so. (Our failures need never be total.) In this section we shall make some remarks about the search for criteria of aesthetic relevance. The search for definition in art can take this form: given any work of art, some facts or observations are relevant to its appreciation or evaluation. Some facts or observations are aesthetically irrelevant. Presumably, then, (says the theory) we can formulate tests by which the aesthetic relevance of any statement can be decided with respect to a given work.

Steven Pepper, in a recent article<sup>10</sup>, proposes a series of such tests. They are formed around a familiar critical assertion: aesthetic experience of a work of art, and especially all critical parts of such experience, must be based upon what is actually in the work. Once, perhaps, this assertion served to eliminate wild irrelevancies from aesthetic conversation. If, in the discussion of a play, we make a remark about the playwright's current social life, someone may snap: "That has nothing to do with the play." Consider, however, the critic who says, "In this symphony, the composer wanted to ..." We may object by saying "What possible relevance could the composer's intentions have? They aren't, after all, in the work." Can the critic respond by saying: (a) "Yes, they are in the work" or (b) "Well, perhaps they aren't in the work, but they're relevant." If he says (b) then we are bound to revise our relevancy

tests. Pepper's, as we have said, are built on the premise that all relevant features are to be found somehow 'imbedded in the passive dispositional structure' of the work (e.g., in the painting as a potential source for aesthetic experience). To understand this, we must know what the work is; we must determine "the correct way to specify the work of art."<sup>11</sup>

Is there, then, a "correct way to specify the work of art" which will put an end to this chain of problems? In ordinary cases, there is little problem saying what the work is. Our normal way of speaking leaves no question about paintings, sculpture, poems or symphonies. We don't say that the work of art is such and such a performance, or some paradigm case of the ideally performed symphony, or the notes in the composer's head, or the manuscript. We say: "That symphony is a work of art." (And we may say things like "That was the symphony as it was meant to be played.") We know all kinds of things that people do with symphonies --- this includes playing them badly. If someone asks: "Well, what is the work of art here?", we may reply: "It is the symphony; don't you know what a symphony is?" If he does, then the problem is solved; if he does not, he will never understand us if we tell him that the 'work itself' is some paradigm case. Pepper says that the work is a "gathering together of many successive perceptual events"; thus, his relevancy tests are formed so as to exclude everything which cannot, in his sense, be imbedded in the 'perceptual material.' This sense, unfortunately, is far from clear. Consider a hybrid case. Suppose a critic talks about a literary work in terms of the historical, literary tradition to which it belongs. Whatever he talks about in the work may well be imbedded in the 'gathering of perceptions'; but what

he says will have no meaning without information about the tradition, which is certainly outside the 'gathering'. Two possible ways out are equally unsatisfactory: either we must deny the relevance of such critical remarks; or we must allow the historical facts to become, in some sense, part of the work (as they surely are, in some sense.) It is possible to question all such expressions as 'part of..' or 'in ... the work'. Is, for example, a novel's moral vision part of it? Dickie seems to think so.

"A novel's moral vision is an essential part of a novel, and if it were removed (I am not sure how such surgery should be carried out) the novel would be greatly changed. Anyway, a novel's moral vision is not like its covers or its binding."<sup>12</sup>

How are we to understand the possibility of dividing a work of art into parts, even if the division removes nothing? To speak of a work of art in this way leads us far away from what goes on in art. Similarly, giving criteria of aesthetic relevance which rule out any elements which are not part of the work seems doomed to ignoring some parts of our intercourse with art. Rather, we do well to ask a critic for his meaning or his motivation with respect to notions like 'inbedded in the work', 'part of the work', etc. Once we have discounted certain wild irrelevancies, it becomes difficult to hold to a distinction between 'in' and 'out' of the work.

We may conclude that it is indeed possible to investigate aesthetic relevance. But there are grounds for being cautious. That results are possible is obvious from the fact that we so often discount certain observations about art (e.g., "the Congressional hack's judgement of Martha Graham's dances or the party hack's judgement of Dr. Zhivago"<sup>13</sup>). Of course, slightly modified these judgements could have a valid place in our discussion. We must resist the temptation

of absolutism. We cannot reasonably hope that our criteria of relevance will tell us everything. This is one thing that Pole might mean by saying that the language of criticism "can never be the language of scientific textbooks."<sup>14</sup> Aesthetic relevance cannot be decided solely in theory or solely in the present; we ought not to close the list of criteria. We may mention again Cavell's remarks about some modern music. Even when we understand what is happening, we can ask whether what we hear is music in our familiar sense. And there is no answer: it is like music, but it is different. Cavell describes what might happen with compositions of modern music.

"Moreover, but still perhaps more rarely, we may find ourselves within the experience of such compositions, following them; and then the question whether this is music and the problem of its tonal sense, will be.... not answered or solved, but rather they will disappear, seem irrelevant."<sup>15</sup>

Similarly, we can treat certain creations from other cultures as art. Anthropologists tell us that we are dealing with objects which may resemble our art, but which are considered by their creators to belong in, as it were, entirely different worlds. What will our criteria and our procedures do with such occurrences. Art may at times come up with whole new ideas of itself; and our existing criteria will have no place, or will be lost.

### § 8. Section Eight

We began this paper hoping to condemn the philosophical tradition which sought a definition in art by characterizing two heaps of attitudes, elements, reasons, judgements &c.: an aesthetic heap and a non-aesthetic one. We darted among various theories to catch the spirits of the philosophical tradition, which defines art by



cutting off all its extraneous extremities, and of what we called the critical tradition, which defines art by building upon a core of ideas. Our bias was clear from the beginning. If a theory is to define art, let it not limit art. And if it is to describe a part of art, let it help us understand how to deal with art.

We moved on to consider three broad classes of theory, each of which was formed around a particular device for characterizing the aesthetic. One class tried to find the key to art in 'appearances'. One class tried to describe an aesthetic attitude, from which all the other troublesome concepts of aesthetics can be defined. The last class of theories retreated to the idea that works of art have aspects which are of distinguishable types. Hopefully, it has become clear that all of these theories have severe limitations. Each one either excludes some important part of our normal experience with art; or it misleads us by using a faulty model of what goes on. The theories did, however, suggest investigations which can be profitable. Notably, we were able to develop the notion of 'aspect' as a descriptive device in aesthetic conversations. Moreover, we cleared up some of the motivation behind attitude theories and expressions like "knowing what a play (poem, symphony) is."

Finally we turned briefly to a revised kind of philosophical investigation. Our discussions of 'universalizability', 'reasons', and 'relevance' have not been aimed at positive theory or result. Rather, we have tried to indicate where philosophy may turn its efforts. Clearly many interesting problems in art (if not, indeed, the most interesting ones) cannot be solved by philosophy: artists, critics, and the general public have the primary responsibility for

setting standards and creating media. But philosophy can be useful in art. What are the peculiarities in the way we talk about art? How do we judge it? We have both public and private standards. What do we do with art? One thing we do is criticize it; this is different from explaining it, or analyzing it. How do we treat art, and how do we treat what is said about it? What do critics mean by 'illusion', 'in the work', etc.? These investigations will reveal what kind of institution art is. If philosophy describes the conventions about saying, e.g., "That's art", then the description will include mention of our normal ways of supporting or discrediting such statements. One feels, as the philosophical answers turn out to be rather insipidly unsurprising, that philosophical descriptions of what happens in art are much like descriptions of musical themes. There is a better way to find out what goes on than by reading descriptions.

"The experience is this passage played like this (that is, as I am doing it, for instance; a description could only hint at it.)"<sup>16</sup>

Chapter 1, Footnotes.

1. cf. Marshal Cohen, "Aesthetic Essence", in Max Black (ed.) Philosophy in America, Ithaca, 1965, Cornell Univ. Press. p. 116
2. ibid.
3. Paul Ziff, "Reasons in Art Criticism", in W.E. Kennick (ed.) Art and Philosophy, New York, 1964, St. Martin's Press, p. 620
4. J. O. Urson, "What Makes a Situation Aesthetic", in Kennick volume, p. 561
5. Marshall Cohen, "Appearance and the Aesthetic Attitude", Journal of Philosophy, November 5, 1959, p. 925
6. ibid., p. 923
7. Cohen, "Aesthetic Essence", op. cit. p. 125
8. Ziff, op. cit., p. 620

Chapter 2, Footnotes.

1. W. E. Kennick, "Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?", Mind, 1958, pp. 312-334
2. DeWitt Parker, "The Nature of Art", Revue Internationale de Philosophie, July, 1939, reprinted in Kennick volume, p. 47
3. "Aesthetic Essence", op. cit.
4. Jerome Stolnitz, "Some Notes on Aesthetic Perception", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXII, 1961, p. 69
6. Philosophical Investigations, § 66, p. 31e. in MacMillan volume
7. Kennick, "... Mistake", op. cit. p. 315
8. ibid., p. 323. The suggestions below occur in his paper
9. ibid., p. 325
10. Schorer, Miles, & Mackenzie, Criticism, New York, 1948, Harcourt Brace
11. Henry James, "The Art of Fiction", in Schorer, Miles and Mackenzie (hereinafter abbreviated SMM), p. 47
12. A.C. Bradley, "Hegel's Theory of Tragedy", in SMM, p. 62
13. T.S. Eliot, "Ulysses", Order, Myth" in SMM, p. 270
14. Lionel Trilling, "Freud and Literature?" in SMM, p. 178
15. Robert Penn Warren, "Pure and Impure Poetry" in SMM, p. 376
16. Henry James, op. cit., p. 47
17. Virginia Woolf, "Mr. Bennet and Mrs. Brown" in SMM, p. 70
18. W.H. Auden, "The Public v. the Late Mr. William Butler Yeats", in SMM, p. 171
19. Lionel Trilling, op. cit., p. 178
20. E.M. Forster, "The Plot", in SMM, p. 284
21. Harry Levin, "Literature as an Institution", in SMM, p. 546
22. J.C. Urson, op. cit., in Kennick volume, p. 552
23. Critique of Judgment, § 1

Chapter 3, Footnotes:

1. From Feeling & Form. For a discussion of the theory see Marshall Cohen, "Appearances ...", op. cit.
2. Vincen Tomas, "Aesthetic Vision", Philosophical Review, 1959, pp. 52-67
3. Urmson, op. cit., p. 561 in Kennick volume
4. Steven Pepper, "The Work of Art Described From a Double Dispositional Base", Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism, XXIII, No. 4 (Summer 1965) pp. 421-427
5. See Duncant's letter, in JAAC, XXIII, No. 4. (Summer 1965), p. 518
6. Tomas, op. cit., p. 58
7. Urmson, op. cit., p. 561
9. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, New York, 1949, University Paperbacks, pp. 216-17
10. J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1964, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 30-32
11. Stolnitz, op. cit., p. 75
12. Cohen, "Appearances ..." op. cit., loc.cit.
13. Ziff, op. cit., p. 619
14. Austin, op. cit., pp. 34, 35. The note is on p. 37
15. Sibley, "Aesthetic & Non-Aesthetic", Philosophical Review, April, 1965, p. 150 and "Aesthetics and the Looks of Things", Journal of Philosophy, November 5, 1959, p. 912
16. Cohen, "Appearances ..." op. cit., p. 924
17. Tomas, op. cit., p. 55
18. ibid., p. 58
19. Stolnitz, op. cit., p. 79 ff.
20. Cohen, "Appearances ..." op. cit., p. 921. The reference is to Nietzsche.
21. Stolnitz, op. cit., p. 80
22. Cohen, "Appearances ...", p. 918
23. Sibley, "Aesthetics & the Looks ...", op. cit., p. 911

Chapter 3, Footnotes (continued)

24. Edward Bullough, "'Psychical Distance' as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle" in Kennick volume, p. 539
25. Stolnitz (op. cit.) uses these terms from Croce
26. Cohen, "Essence ...", op. cit., p. 119
27. Kant, Critique of Judgement, Div. I, § 2
28. Bullough, op. cit., p. 534-5, in Kennick
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30. ibid., p. 118
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32. ibid., p. 58
33. ibid.
34. Cohen, "Essence ...", op. cit., p. 125
35. ibid.
36. Republic, Book X, 598
37. Stanley Cavell, "Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy", in Black volume, p. 85
38. Ziff, op. cit., p. 608 in Kennick volume
39. ibid.
40. ibid., p. 614
41. ibid.
42. ibid., p. 620
43. Dickie, op. cit., p. 60
44. ibid.
45. George Dickie, letter in the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Summer, 1965, p. 519
46. D.L. Pyle, "The Varieties of Aesthetic Experience", Philosophy, XXX, 1955, pp. 238-248
48. Ziff, op. cit., p. 615

Chapter 3, Footnotes (continued)

49. Sibley, "Looks ... ", op. cit., p. 912
50. Philosophical Investigations, 1953, New York, MacMillan, Part II, xi, p. 193e
51. ibid., p. 194e
52. ibid., p. 199e
53. ibid., p. 211e
54. ibid., p. 197e
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56. ibid., p. 214e
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58. ibid., p. 206e
59. ibid., p. 198e
60. ibid.
61. Wittgenstein, the Blue and Brown Books, Oxford, 1960, Basil Blackwell, p. 164
62. ibid., p. 165
63. Dickie, letter, op. cit. (note #45) p. 520

Chapter 4, Footnotes

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2. Cavell, op. cit., p. 87
4. Ziff, op. cit., p. 607 in Kennick volume
5. ibid., p. 608
6. Sibley, "Aesthetic & Non-Aesthetic", op. cit., p. 148
7. ibid., p. 144
9. Cavell, op. cit., p. 94
10. Pepper, op. cit. Future quotes from Pepper come from this article.
11. Dickie, letter, op. cit. ((JAAC, Summer 1965), p. 521
12. Dickie, "The Myth ... ", op. cit., p. 60
13. Cohen, "Essence ...", op. cit., p. 133
14. Pole, op. cit., part I
15. Cavell, op. cit., p. 84
16. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, p. 183e



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